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DETERMINANTS OF PATENT QUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
Brian J. Love*
Shawn P. Miller†
Shawn Ambwani‡
Draft, v. Feb. 7, 2018
Abstract: We study the determinants of patent “quality”—the likelihood that an
issued patent can survive a post-grant validity challenge. We do so by taking
advantage of two recent developments in the U.S. patent system. First, rather
than relying on the relatively small and highly-selected set of patents scrutinized
by courts, we study instead the larger and broader set of patents that have been
subjected to inter partes review, a recently established administrative procedure
for challenging the validity of issued patents. Second, in addition to analyzing
characteristics observable on the face of challenged patents, we utilize datasets
recently made available by the USPTO to gather detailed information about the
prosecution and examination of studied patents. We find a significant
relationship between validity and a number of characteristics of a patent and its
owner, prosecutor, examiner, and prosecution history. For example, patents
prosecuted by large law firms, pharmaceutical patents, and patents with more
words per claim are significantly more likely to survive inter partes review. On
the other hand, patents obtained by small entities, patents assigned to examiners
with higher allowance rates, patents with more U.S. patent classes, and patents
with higher reverse citation counts are less likely to survive review. Our results
reveal a number of strategies that may help applicants, patent prosecutors, and
USPTO management increase the quality of issued patents. Our findings also
suggest that inter partes review is, as Congress intended, eliminating patents that
appear to be of relatively low quality.
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INTRODUCTION
In theory, the patent system allows firms to treat their inventions as liquid
assets that can be transferred to others better positioned to use them via a thick
secondary market that indirectly matches inventors and implementers.1 In this
way, ideas (like capital) can flow to their highest and best use, guided by the
invisible hand of the market. But reality falls far short of this ideal. Unlike stocks,
bonds, and other securities, there is to date no generally accepted methodology
for evaluating patents. The market for patents is thin, opaque, and based largely
on the value of ex post assertion against independent inventors, rather than ex
ante licensing to eager commercializers.2
The result is a patent system all-too-often plagued by strategic behavior.
For example, a lack of reliable methods for measuring patent scope and quality
contributed to the rise of “patent assertion entities”—patent monetization
specialists that are uniquely able to wield various forms of “holdup” power over
the parties they sue in order to extract settlements that reflect more than the value
of the asserted patent.3 Conversely, the costs inherent in participating in an
1

See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2000) (arguing that “the ability of owners
of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights in whole or in part is an important feature
of the systems . . . . [because] rights can easily arise in the hands of persons or firms who are not
in the best position to exploit them”); see also Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENVER U.
L. REV. 199, 211-14 (2006) (describing ways in which the patent system facilitates the transfer
of patent rights); Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 93 (2013)
(proposing that patent portfolios be regulated like securities).
2
See Brian J. Love, et al., An Empirical Study of the “Brokered” Patent Market, 83 MO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (collecting data on patents offered for sale by patent brokers between 2012
and 2016); Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 257, 257-59 (2007) (describing problems created by the “blind market” for patents).
3
See Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive
Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 51 (2013) (“In essence,
nonpracticing entities act as arbitrageurs, first acquiring patents, typically from individual
inventors or small companies, and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies
through litigation.”). The term “patent assertion entity” is typically defined to encompass all nonpracticing patent enforcers, except universities, early stage startups, and IP holding subsidiaries
of operating technology companies. See Informational Hearing on Patent Assertion Entities
Before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technology, (Oct 30, 2013)
(statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138. Because PAEs do not compete
with the companies that they sue, they are able to take advantage of several holdup opportunities
that are generally not available to operating companies. For example, because PAEs do not sell
products that compete with those produced by alleged infringers, they are able to avoid
countersuit and thus can generally leverage asymmetric litigation costs against the parties they
sue. See id. In addition, because PAEs sue to recover monetary damages rather than injunctions
to protect market share, they can strategically delay suit until alleged infringers are “locked in”
to using the allegedly infringing technology and, thus, cannot easily switch to a non-infringing
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inefficient market contribute to the fact that many tech companies choose to turn
a blind eye to the market entirely, a practice decried by many patentees as
“holdout” behavior designed to raise the cost of patent enforcement.4
In an attempt to make the market more efficient and thereby reduce holdup
and holdout, legal scholars, economists, and business professionals have
experimented for years with methodologies for quickly assessing the scope and
quality of a given patent or portfolio.5 But so far, reliable solutions have proven
elusive.6 Indeed, even companies that prosecute large patent portfolios covering
their own technologies are often unable to reliably identify their best patents.
Consider, for example, the fact that large tech companies routinely lose multimillion dollar patent suits—even when the patents they assert were previously
deemed “essential” to important technology standards.7 Overall, asserted patents
are at least partially invalidated about 40 percent of the time the issue is
litigated,8 and overall patentees win only about one-quarter of patent cases
litigated to a decision on the merits.9

alternative. See Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (“By pursuing a patent license ex post, after a product has been created,
rather than ex ante, at the time the product is being designed, the patent owner can leverage not
only the economic value of the invention, but also the cost of changing the product.”).
4
See Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra, at 20 (defining patent holdout as “the practice
of companies ignoring patents and patent demands because the high costs of enforcing patents
makes prosecution unlikely”).
5
See, e.g., Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 116-17
(2011) (“[B]oth scholars and practitioners are seeking ways to improve how patents are valued,
with scholars often calling for greater disclosure of sale terms to aid in setting market prices and
practitioners focusing on refining methods for predicting a patent’s value to their own clients.”).
6
See, e.g., Kevin G. Rivette, et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 54 (“[O]ne would be hard-pressed to find a major investment bank that
employs even one individual with experience in evaluating patent portfolios . . . . [A]s matters
stand now, ‘due diligence’ regarding patent assets is usually more myth than reality.”); Markus
Reitzig, Improving Patent Valuations for Management Purposes: Validating New Indicators by
Analyzing Application Rationales, 33 RES. POL’Y 939, 939 (2004) (“[D]espite the diversity of
articles from Industrial Organization (IO) or legal scholars on value related issues of intellectual
property rights, there is a lack of scientific papers that restructure the knowledge on the
evaluation of patent rights from a corporate perspective.”).
7
See RPX, Standard Essential Patents: How Do They Fare? (2014), https://www.rpxcorp.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Standard-Essential-Patents-How-Do-They-Fare.pdf (finding that
plaintiffs like Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, and others successfully enforced standard-essential
patents just 12 to 29 percent of the time between 2005 and June 2014).
8
See John Allison, et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1787 (2014) (collecting statistics for all patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009).
9
Id. at 1788. See also Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and
Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6-7 (2013) (estimating
that more than one quarter of all granted U.S. patents would be found at least partially anticipated
or obvious if litigated).
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In addition to vexing patent owners, there is reason to believe that the
patent system’s failure to reliably produce valid patents has broad implications
for the economy and innovation generally. Uncertainty about patent quality
generates transaction costs for companies attempting to navigate the patent
landscape.10 In addition to slowing the pace of research and development at
existing firms, these costs can deter companies from entering a market in the
first place11 and discourage the combination of complementary technologies to
form new ones.12
As a result, patent policymakers have long sought guidance on how to
design patent office procedures that produce high-quality patents. In 2015, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) launched a “Patent Quality
Initiative” overseen by a newly created “Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Quality.”13 Similarly, the European Patent Office formed a “Working Party on
Patent Quality” in 2017,14 and the Japanese Patent Office released a new
“Quality Policy on Patent Examination” in 2014 and published a “Quality
Management Manual” for patent examiners in 2016.15
Despite intense interest, however, there have been relatively few formal
studies of patent quality conducted to date. Among other reasons, both public
and private studies of patent quality have been hindered by two methodological
obstacles. The first is a paucity of post-grant decisions on patent validity. While
thousands of patent suits are filed each year, just a tiny fraction are litigated to a

10

See Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System:
Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 992 (2004) (“Low quality
patents can create considerable uncertainty among inventors or would-be commercializers of
inventions, which in turn can slow either the pace of innovation or investment in the
commercialization of new technologies.”); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong are Weak
Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347, 1361 (2008) (presenting an economic model predicting that
weak patents can nonetheless command substantial royalty payments and concluding that “there
are large social benefits, ex post and, perhaps more importantly, ex ante, of better examining
commercially significant patents”).
11
See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 489-90 (1995)
(finding in a study of 419 biotechnology companies that smaller firms with relatively high
litigation costs are less likely to file for patents in technology areas where established competitors
with relatively low litigation costs have already been granted patents).
12
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) (arguing that a proliferation of
overlapping patent rights to technologies can create an “anticommons” that deters the
commercialization of new products).
13
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Quality, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/patent-quality (last
accessed July 27, 2017).
14
Euro. Pat. Off., Engaging with Users on Patent Quality (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.epo.org/
news-issues/news/2017/20170124.html.
15
Japan Pat. Off., Quality Management on Patent Examination, https://www.jpo.go.jp/seido_e/
quality_mgt/patent.htm (last accessed July 27, 2017).
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decision on the merits.16 And, even when cases are litigated to a decision on
validity, many such decisions address only a subset of the claims or arguments
at issue in the case.17 Many others are also later reversed on appeal.18 Moreover,
those that are litigated are highly selected. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
the most vulnerable litigated patents are those least likely to be challenged on
the merits in court.19 As a result, prior studies often analyzed relatively small,
disparate samples of patents, making their findings hard to generalize.20
16

According to Lex Machina, just 4 percent of patent cases filed between 2000 and 2015 were
litigated to a jury verdict, grant of summary judgment, or JMOL. Lex Machina, Inc.,
https://lexmachina.com/ (search conducted July 27, 2017). In a study of all patent cases filed in
2008 and 2009, Allison et al. found just 430 decisions on validity that represented an (at least
partial) “win” for either the patentee or a defendant. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities
of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note _, at 1778. Moreover, these decisions likely involved
fewer than 430 unique patents. Id. (noting that the 949 total decisions studied involved 777
unique patents).
17
According to Docket Navigator, only about 28 percent of decided motions for summary
judgment of invalidity are granted in full. Docket Navigator, Inc., https://www.docketnavigator.
com/ (search conducted Aug. 1, 2017). Moreover, motions granted in full will themselves often
only relate to a subset of claims at issue in a case.
18
Overall, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reverses in about 15 percent of appeals,
and the rate has historically been much higher for appeals involving a review of claim
construction. See Ted M. Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 1161 (2010); J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. L. REV.
1 (2014); Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim Construction
Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809 (2014). Claim construction is an integral part of
adjudicating patent quality as it is generally the first step to both infringement and validity
analysis. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
19
A substantial portion of patent suits filed by non-practicing entities settle quickly, often in a
matter of months, for amounts that fall below defendants’ expected cost of defense. See FED.
TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: A FTC STUDY 4-5 (2016), https://www.
ftc.gov/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study (finding that the majority of patent suits
filed by “Litigation PAEs” settled within one year of filing and for less than $300,000, an amount
that “approximates the lower bound of early-stage litigation costs of defending a patent
infringement suit”). Few defendants would rationally choose to defend such cases on the merits,
and thus many patents asserted in such cases are rarely, if ever, subjected to validity challenges
in court. See Statement of Brian J. Love, supra note _, at 3 (“If . . . the costs of defense . . . are
large relative to the value of the patented technology at issue, then the strength of their
infringement allegations quickly becomes irrelevant. Tech companies accused of infringing a
PAE’s patent will be willing to – and, in fact, generally do – settle for amounts that primarily
reflect the cost of fighting in court, and not the value of the patent that is allegedly infringed.”).
20
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194 (1998) (studying all 299 patents that were the subject of a final
validity decision reported in the U.S.P.Q. between 1989 and 1996); Ian M. Cockburn, et al., Are
All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 17, 19 (WESLEY M. COHEN & STEPHEN A.
MERRILL EDS., 2003) (studying “182 patents for which the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) ruled on validity between 1997 and 2000”); Ronald Mann & Marian
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The second obstacle is difficulty obtaining detailed information about
individual patents. Until recently, U.S. patent-level data was spread across
numerous databases, each designed to prevent the automatic collection of
information by members of the public.21 As a result, many prior studies looked
only at information that could be collected from the face of studied patents. But
doing so prevented researchers from including in their analyses detailed
information about the patent’s prosecution history, including characteristics of
prosecution counsel and the examiner assigned to the application.
In this paper, we take advantage of two recent developments in the U.S.
patent system that make it possible to overcome these prior limitations and study
patent quality more comprehensively than ever before. First, rather than relying
on the set of patents scrutinized by courts or juries in recent years, we study
instead the larger set of patents that have been subjected to inter partes review,
a recently established administrative procedure for challenging the validity of
issued patents. Second, rather than relying solely on characteristics observable
on the face of studied patents, we query datasets recently made available by the
USPTO to gather detailed information about the prosecution and examination of
studied patents.22 Our study is, we believe, the largest and most comprehensive
examination of patent quality conducted to date.
Our multivariate analysis, which controls for almost two dozen attributes
of challenged patents, suggests that inter alia:
 PAE- and NPE-owned patents are significantly more likely to be instituted
(by about 5 and 7 percent, respectively) when challenged in inter partes
review, while pharmaceutical patents are between 6 and 11 percent less
likely to be instituted;

Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMP.
L. STUD. 1, 7 (2012) (studying all 366 patents that were the subject of Federal Circuit invalidity
decisions made from 2003 through 2009); Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent
Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2158 (2014) (studying “a
data set of 366 patents, which constitute the universe of patents for which the Federal Circuit
issued a final decision on validity during the period 2003–2009”); Yutaka Niidome, The Relation
of Patent Description and Examination with Validity: An Empirical Study, 111 SCIENTOMETRICS
159, 168, 171 (2017) (studying all 267 patents that (i) had an application date between October
2001 and December 2004, (ii) were granted before April 2014, and (ii) were the subject of a
completed validity challenge decided by the JPO’s Board of Appeals). But see Miller, Where’s
the Innovation, supra note _, at 16 (studying the population of 980 patents with final validity
decisions on the grounds of anticipation and obviousness—the only bases for review in inter
partes review—among all lawsuits filed in the eleven years from 2000 through 2010).
21
For example, the USPTO’s “Patent Application Information Retrieval” (PAIR) database,
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair, periodically requires users to complete a “captcha” to
prevent the automatic collection of data about the prosecution of patent applications.
22
See infra notes _.
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Patents applied for by “small entities” and patents prosecuted by solo
practitioners are each 5 percent more likely to be instituted, while patents
prosecuted by large law firms are 6 percent less likely to be instituted;
Patents assigned to more U.S. patent classes are more likely to be
instituted, with each additional class associated with a 0.6 percent increase
in the chance of institution;
Patents with more total words per claim and patents with more unique
words in claim 1 are both less likely to be instituted, with an increase of
1,000 total words per claim or an increase of ten additional words in claim
1 each associated with a one percent decrease in the chance of institution;
Patents with more reverse citations and patents with more reverse citations
added by the examiner are both more likely to be instituted, with an
additional 10 reverse citations associated with a 0.15 percent increase in
the chance of institution, and an additional 10 reverse citations added by
the examiner associated with an impressive 1.8 percent increase in the
chance of institution; and
Patents reviewed by more experienced examiners, patents reviewed by
examiners with higher allowance rates, and patents reviewed by examiners
in art units with higher allowance rates are all more likely to be instituted,
with a roughly 2.5 percent increase in the likelihood of institution
associated with each additional 1,000 applications under an examiner’s
belt, each 10 percent increase in an examiner’s allowance rate, and each 10
percent increase in an art unit’s allowance rate.

In addition to advancing the literature on patent quality, our findings have
importance for ongoing policy debates. As described in detail infra, the
continued existence of administrative patent challenges in the U.S. is uncertain
at this time. In both Congress and the courts, opponents of post grant
administrative review have sought to weaken or altogether eliminate existing
procedures. At the core of this policy debate is a dispute about whether
administrative review of issued patents helps or harms innovation on net. As
explained below, our results suggest that inter partes review is, on average,
eliminating patents with characteristics traditionally associated with “weakness”
and, thus, are consistent with arguments that the procedure is functioning as
originally intended.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief review of the existing
academic literature on patent value and quality. Part II briefly describes ex ante
patent examination and post grant patent challenges. Part III describes our data
collection methodology, and Parts IV and V report our findings and discuss their
implications.
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I. PATENT “VALUE” AND PATENT “QUALITY”
Patents (unlike the technologies that they cover) have no inherent worth;
rather they entitle their owner to seek redress against an alleged infringer by
filing a lawsuit.23 To successfully litigate a patent infringement claim, a patent
owner must both prove that the allegedly infringing products or actions fall
within the scope of a patent claim and successfully defend against the accused
infringer’s inevitable defense that the asserted patent claim fails to satisfy the
requirements for patent protection and, thus, should never have been issued in
the first place.24 In this Part, we summarize existing research regarding the
relationship between the observable characteristics of a patent and its value or
quality.
A. Patent Value
For decades, scholars have studied the relationships between a patent’s
importance and its observable characteristics. The earliest, and most developed,
of these literatures examines patent citations. This literature focuses on the extent
to which a given patent has been cited by subsequent patents, primarily as a
metric for the fundamental importance of the disclosed invention to future
innovators and innovations.25 Tallies, types, and patterns of these so-called
“forward citations” have be used by academics, inter alia, to measure the relative

23

See Jonathan Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 127
(2015) (“No one would ever license a patent absent the threat of litigation. If a patent holder
could not threaten to enforce its patent against a putative licensee in court, the licensee would
have no reason to negotiate a license in the first place. Patent licenses are best understood as civil
settlements in anticipation of possible litigation.”).
24
The defense of invalidity is raised in virtually every patent suit litigated in the U.S. See Mark
A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495, 1502 (2001)
(“Virtually every patent infringement lawsuit includes a claim that the patent is either invalid or
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct (or commonly both).”). In other countries, this is not
always so. See Brian J. Love, et al., Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local
Economy?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 736 (2016) (finding that less than fourteen percent
of invention patents enforced in China between 2006 and 2011 were challenged on validity
grounds); Brian J. Love, et al., Patent Assertion Entities in Europe, in PATENT ASSERTION
ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 104, 112 (D. DANIEL SOKOL, ED., 2017) (finding that “fewer
than half of German and U.K. patent suits . . . included a validity challenge”).
25
See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON.
16, 16 (2005) (studying “the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the ‘importance’ of a
firm’s patents, as indicated by the stock market valuation of the firm’s intangible stock of
knowledge”); ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2002); Manuel Trajtenberg, A
Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172
(1990).
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importance of various kinds of patents (such as those covering software26 or
those filed by universities27 or lone inventors28), to identify firms undervalued
by the stock market,29 to track the geographic or institutional flow of
knowledge,30 and even to predict the emergence of new technologies.31 They
have also given rise to numerous analytics firms that mine patent citation data in
an attempt to rank or value patents.32
That said, citation-based patent rankings have been criticized as well.
Commentators have noted many ways in which citation counts are biased, and
thus difficult to compare over time and across technologies.33 In fact, there is
reason to doubt that citation counts reliably measure what scholars assume that
they do. Research suggests that patents are rarely read for their technical

26

See John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 297, 321 (2007); Josh Lerner, et al., Financial Patent Quality: Finance Patents After
State Street, at *16 (Harvard Business Sch. Working Paper No. 16-068, 2015).
27
See Bhaven N. Sampat, et al., Changes in University Patent Quality after the Bayh–Dole Act:
a Re-examination, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371 (2003).
28
See Jasjit Singh & Lee Fleming, Lone Inventors as Sources of Breakthroughs: Myth or
Reality?, 56 MGMT. SCI. 41 (2010).
29
See Mark Hirschey & Vernon J. Richardson, Are Scientific Indicators of Patent Quality Useful
to Investors?, 11 J. EMP. FIN. 91 (2004); Anthony Breitzman & Peter Thomas, Using Patent
Citation Analysis to Target/Value M&A Candidates, 45 RES. TECH. MGMT. 28 (2002).
30
See Peter Thompson & Melanie Fox-Kean, Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge
Spillovers: A Reassessment, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 450 (2005); Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel
Trajtenberg, Flows of Knowledge from Universities and Federal Laboratories: Modeling the
Flow of Patent Citations Over Time and Across Institutional and Geographic Boundaries, 93
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12671 (1996); Adam B. Jaffe, et al., Geographic Localization of
Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577 (1993).
31
See Peter Erdi, et al., Prediction of Emerging Technologies Based on Analysis of the US Patent
Citation Network, 95 SCIENTOMETRICS 225 (2013); Tugrul U. Daim, et al., Forecasting
Emerging Technologies: Use of Bibliometrics and Patent Analysis, 73 TECH. FORECASTING &
SOCIAL CHANGE 981 (2006).
32
See, e.g., AcclaimIP, Quantitative Patent Scoring, http://www.acclaimip.com/articles/
quantitative-patent-scoring/ (last accessed Aug. 10, 2017); Innography, PatentStrength: Patent
Value, https://www.innography.com/why-innography/patentstrength (last accessed Aug. 10,
2017); PatentVector, About PatentVector, http://www.patentvector.com/about.php (last
accessed Aug. 10, 2017); Unified Patents, Analytics Tools, https://www.unifiedpatents.com/
tools/ (last accessed Aug. 10, 2017) (“CITation IndeX (CITX) is an internally developed tool to
measure patent value. Studies have found market value is strongly correlated to Forward
Citations.”).
33
See Jeffrey M. Kuhn, et al., Patent Citations Reexamined: New Data and Methods (Working
Paper, Aug. 9, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714954; Nicolas
van Zeebroeck, The Puzzle of Patent Value Indicators, 20 ECON. INNOV. & NEW TECH. 33, _
(2011) (“[C]itation counts are difficult to interpret by nature, due to their lack of natural scale . .
. . [which] makes citation counts difficult to compare across time and industries, where different
scales in citation intensity have been observed”).
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content.34 And, anecdotes abound of citation-related gamesmanship by
patentees, including to artificially inflate citations of their own patents.35
Another, related literature examines the characteristics of patents that are
revealed by their owners’ actions to be of relatively high or relatively low private
value. Because direct evidence of the value parties place on patent rights is
rarely made public,36 scholars have traditionally studied proxies for value. For
example, in one seminal study, Allison, et al., compared the characteristics of
patents selected for assertion in court to those not chosen.37 Other scholars have
studied instead, or in addition, the characteristics of patents that were and were
not renewed by their owners in exchange for payment of periodic maintenance

See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. STATE L. REV. 19, 21 (“[R]esearchers and
companies in component industries simply ignore patents. Virtually everyone does it. They do it
at all stages of endeavor.”). But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE
BIOTECH. 421, 421 (2017) (finding in a survey of scientific researchers that “[t]he vast majority
of respondents had at least some experience reading patents, and just over half of the patent
readers had read more than five patents in the past year”).
35
Some companies, for example, frequently cite large numbers of their own prior patents in new
applications. In addition, applicants may strategically decide to cite relatively few or many
patents for a variety of reasons unrelated to the importance of the patented invention. See James
H. Richardson, Are Prior Art Citation Determinative of Patent Approval: An Empirical Analysis
of the Strategy behind Citing Prior Art, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25 (2015).
36
See Lemley & Mhyrvold, supra, at 257 (noting that “[e]ven if [a] patent or ones like it have
been licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, including the price itself, will
almost invariably be confidential”); Kelley, supra note _, at 130 n.82 (noting that “[t]he vast
majority of IP licenses and technology sales occur on confidential bases” and that
“confidentiality is often highly negotiated between the parties”). Nonetheless, some licenses and
sales become public when, for example, securities regulations require their disclosure. See SEC
Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Item 1.01, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (requiring the disclosure of
“material definitive agreement[s] not made in the ordinary course of business”); Thomas R.
Varner, An Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON.
229 (2011) (studying 1,458 patent licenses and transfers disclosed to the SEC). Others are
occasionally admitted into evidence in patent suits. See Tejas N. Narechania & J. Taylor
Kirkland, An Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement Related Evidence for Damages
Determinations in Patent Litigation, 2012 ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 19-25 (collecting court
orders discussing the discoverability and admissibility of licenses).
37
John R. Allison, et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004). See also Colleen V. Chien,
Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011); Alan Marco, The Option Value of
Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. ECON. 232 (2005); Alan C. Marco &
Richard Miller, Patent Examination Quality and Litigation: Is There a Link? (USPTO Economic
Working Paper No. 2017-09, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2995698.
34
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fees.38 And, more recently, a small number of studies have been conducted using
actual pricing information gleaned from the secondary market for patents.39
Though nomenclature is not standardized in these lines of scholarship, we
refer herein to the studies described above as studies of patent “value” because
they most directly measure the correlation between patent characteristics and a
patent’s private and/or social value. While this link is rather obvious for
maintenance fee payments and market prices, we believe it is also true for
citation-based studies. Forward citations have long been viewed in the literature
as a metric for measuring a patent’s effectiveness at carrying out the patent
system’s fundamental social goal of publicizing important technical
information,40 and numerous studies have additionally suggested a strong,
positive relationship between forward citations and a patent’s realized or
revealed private value.41
B. Patent Quality
In this paper, we study a different metric: the likelihood that a patent will
survive a post-grant challenge to its validity. We refer to this as patent
“quality.”42 While value and quality are related, they are nonetheless distinct.
38

See, e.g., James Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37
RES. POL’Y 932 (2008); Yi Deng, Renewal Study of European Patents: A Three-country
Comparison (Working Paper, 2005), available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/smu/ecowpa/0514
.html; Dietmar Harhoff, et al., Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV.
ECON. STATS. 511 (1999); Jean Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual
Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405 (1998).
39
See Erik Oliver, et al., Finding the Best Patents: Forward Citation Analysis Still Wins,
IPWatchdog (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/03/24/finding-best-patentsforward-citation-analysis-still-wins/id=67192/; Christina Odasso et al., Selling Patents at
Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Patent Value, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 417 (2014)
(studying 535 lots auctioned by Ocean Tomo between 2006 and 2008); K.A. Sneed & D.K.N.
Johnson, Selling Ideas: the Determinants of Patent Value in an Auction Environment, 39 R&D
MGMT. 87 (2008) (studying 121 Ocean Tomo lots resulting in 51 sales).
40
See, e.g., Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 3 (“The most advanced literature about patent
quality . . . has analyzed the extent to which patents reﬂect and facilitate the diffusion of
knowledge, as evidenced by citations to and in patents.”).
41
See supra note _.
42
Here, we follow the lead of Mann and Underweiser. Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 4
(“[T]his article conceives of quality as legal validity.”). See also R. Polk Wagner, Understanding
Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (“Patent quality is the
capacity of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of patentability . . . .”);
Bronwyn Hall, et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition, 4
INNOV. POL’Y & ECON. 115, 118 (2004) (“Both the economic and legal views suggest that highquality patents describe an invention that is truly new, rather than an invention that is already in
widespread use but not yet patented.”). We caution, however, that others have used the term in
a variety of contexts. See Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 2 (“Because the term ‘quality’
is itself so general, it should not be surprising that different groups of scholars have used the
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Quality vs. Value

The distinction is perhaps easiest to see in the context of social value. A
patent’s ability to disseminate detailed, groundbreaking technical information to
the public is conceptually unrelated to the validity of its claims. For example, an
important disclosure may be accompanied by claims that are overbroad or even
irrelevant. Few would doubt, for example, that Samuel Morse’s patent on the
telegraph was highly cited, despite the fact that he famously claimed patent
rights to “electro-magnetism, however developed” for communicating “at any
distances,”43 a scope so broad that it would seemingly cover pre-existing forms
of communication using fires or lanterns,44 as well as virtually every after-arising
telecommunications technology. In fact, studies of patent citations have revealed
that many highly cited patent applications are never issued at all.45
The distinction between quality and private value—i.e., value derived from
the ability to enforce a patent—is a bit more nuanced. Because a patentee must
generally prove infringement and overcome an invalidity defense to win a patent
suit, it stands to reason that patent quality is typically an integral component of
patent value. But, while it is true that value and quality are theoretically related
in this manner, it is less clear how well the two are correlated in practice. For
one, the “value” of a patent is a factor of the value of the technology that it
covers.46 Thus, a low quality patent that covers high value technology may well
have more “value” than a high quality patent that covers low value technology.
At best, then, patent value is a noisy proxy for measuring the performance of the
patent system.
term to examine distinct concepts relevant to their own interests.”). See also U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., Quality Metrics, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/quality-metrics1#step1 (last accessed Dec. 8, 2017) (including, inter alia, metrics related to examination
efficiency, grant rate consistency, and “stakeholder” perceptions); Christi J. Guerrini, Defining
Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3091 (2014) (proposing that “patent quality” be
examined “using a methodology applied in the business literature of quality management”).
43
See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854) (invalidating claim 8 of Morse’s patent).
44
Light is, after all, part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electromagnetic Spectrum, MerriamWebster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/electromagnetic%20spectrum (defining the term as “the entire range of wavelengths or frequencies of electromagnetic radiation
extending from gamma rays to the longest radio waves and including visible light”).
45
See van Zeebroeck, supra note _, _ (reporting that “one fifth of the most cited applications
have never been granted”).
46
Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 4 (“[A] poorly drafted patent of dubious validity might
be worth tens (or hundreds) of millions of dollars if it purports to claim rights to a valuable
product (like the Blackberry or Microsoft Word). Conversely, a patent drafted with sterling
clarity and undoubted novelty might be worth little or nothing if the product that it describes is
unmarketable.”); Marco, supra note _, at _ (“Thus, the value of a patent is a function of the
enforceability of the property right, the underlying technology, and the distribution of beliefs
about those parameters.”).
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Second, there is good reason to believe that in recent history success in
patent litigation (and thus patent value) has been influenced more by the breadth
of a patent’s claims than by the likelihood that those claims could withstand a
full-throated validity challenge. For one, patents asserted in court are presumed
to be valid,47 and the validity of their claims must be disproven by the accused
infringer with “clear and convincing” evidence.48 What’s more, a significant
share of patent suits brought in the last two decades—perhaps even a majority—
were filed by patentees with no intention of litigating to a decision on the merits
of their claims. Each year since 2008, non-practicing entities have filed more
than half of all U.S. patent infringement claims.49 Because NPEs cannot be
countersued for infringement and because U.S. courts rarely award fees to
prevailing parties,50 non-practicing patentees are often able to leverage the high
cost of patent litigation defense51 to extract large settlements even in suits
asserting patents that are likely invalid. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission
observed in a recent study of the licensing behavior of 22 PAEs (with 327 patent
asserting affiliates) that the majority of PAE suits settled quickly, generally
within one year, and most often for amounts below the cost of defending the case
to even a preliminary ruling on the merits.52
The primacy of claim breadth over validity is borne out by the secondary
market as well. It has been reported that patent sales and prices are primarily
driven by the scope of patent claims, not their validity.53 For example, patents
offered for sale are virtually never circulated to potential buyers along with prior
art search reports, but are frequently accompanied by “evidence of use”

35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid . . . . [and t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).
48
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (“We consider whether [35 U.S.C.] § 282
requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that it
does.”).
49
See Shawn P. Miller, et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset,
https://law.stanford.edu/publications/introduction-to-the-stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/ (last
accessed Jan. 25, 2018).
50
See Thomas F. Cotter & John M. Golden, Empirical Studies Relating to Patents—Remedies,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter Menell
et al., eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2665680 (manuscript at 15-16 & n.71).
51
See AIPLA, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-142 (reporting that the median cost of
defending a relatively small patent suit filed by an NPE (i.e., one with less than $1 million at
stake) at $500,000).
52
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 49 (Oct. 2016) (reporting
that lawsuits filed by “Litigation PAEs” generally “settled within a year of filing and . . . for less
than $300,000”).
53
It is our anecdotal experience that many large, sophisticated patent buyers select patents for
purchase almost exclusively on the basis of the technology that they cover and the breadth of
their claims.
47
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documentation suggesting that the patent may be infringed by one or more large
tech companies.54
If it is true that a credible threat to sue has been in recent memory more
important than a credible threat of winning, then it is likewise true that metrics
of patent value and quality will often point in different directions. After all, broad
claims are both more likely to cover an accused product and more likely to cover
the prior art.
ii.

The Importance of Quality

In addition to theoretical and practical distinctions between patent value
and quality, there are at least two more reasons why patent quality deserves
additional attention from scholars of the patent system. First, studies of patent
quality are more likely than studies of patent value to lead to actionable
recommendations for improving the patent system. Factors that the literature
tells us influence patent value are often outside the control of patent applicants
and patent examiners. There is little a patent applicant can do at the time of filing
to influence the value of the covered technology or the citation patterns of future
inventors. The path of future innovation is notoriously difficult to predict.55 As
a result, studies of patent value are generally unable to make recommendations
that patent system stakeholders can operationalize.
On the other hand, many suspected determinants of patent quality are very
much within the ex ante control of applicants and examiners.56 For example,
patent prosecutors and examiners have long assumed a link between claim length
and validity. This conventional wisdom is embodied in the so-called “pencil”
and “hand” tests, which predict that patent claims that either can be covered by
a pencil, or cannot be covered by one’s hand, are unlikely to be both valid and
infringed.57 If studies like this one can identify where improvements can be
made, patent applicants and examiners can likely adjust their procedures or
habits to improve the quality of granted patents.

See Love, et al., supra note _, at *19 (finding that “[p]ackages listed with EOUs are
disproportionately likely to sell and, in addition, are likely to sell at a premium”).
55
See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed., 2012)
(conceptualizing the progress of science as one marked by occasional, sudden “paradigm shifts,”
rather than a linear progression driven by the gradual accumulation of information).
56
For a discussion of ways in which modifications to applicant behavior might be able to
improve patent quality, see Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant
Incentives, 28 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 77 (2014). For a discussion of prior studies documenting
variations in the behavior of patent examiners, see Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent
Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149 (2014).
57
See, e.g., The Hand Test Revisited, IPcopy (Nov. 15, 2012), https://ipcopy.wordpress.com/
2012/11/15/the-hand-test-revisited/.
54
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Second, the winds of change are blowing in U.S. patent law. Increasingly,
validity is king when it comes to successful patent enforcement. Since the
passage of the America Invents Act (AIA),58 it has become more and more
common for asserted patents to be quickly challenged in administrative
proceedings before the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board.59 Today,
parties to a patent suit regularly receive at least a preliminary decision on claim
validity from the PTAB before incurring the high cost of discovery, not to
mention before the court conducts claim construction, rules on summary
judgment motions, or holds a trial.60 Increasingly, this is also true even for
patents asserted by PAEs that are willing to settle for relatively small nuisancevalue amounts. In 2016, Unified Patents, Inc. (for which one of us works)
challenged patents owned by Shipping and Transit, LLC and Sportbrain
Technologies, LLC,61 which collectively had been asserted in well over 200
lawsuits that settled on average within 100 days of filing,62 likely for relatively
small amounts.63 As a result, validity is more important than ever to the
evaluation of patents, and we expect this importance to increase as an everhigher percentage of asserted patents are challenged before the PTAB.
iii.

Existing Studies of Quality

Despite the benefits that can be realized from studying the characteristics
of high- and low-quality patent, scholars have paid the topic relatively little
interest. Just a handful of existing studies attempt to measure the determinants
of patent quality (defined as validity). In what is probably the most important
study of patent quality conducted to date, Mann and Underweiser studied the
58

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
various sections of Title 35).
59
See, e.g., Erin Coe, PTAB’s Skyrocketing Petition Rate Starts To Stabilize, Law.com (Feb. 11,
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/756867/ptab-s-skyrocketing-petition-rate-starts-to-sta
bilize (“The Patent Trial and Appeal Board took in nearly 1,800 total petitions in 2015 for another
record year as defendants in litigation continue to turn to the popular venue to wage validity
fights over patents they are accused of infringing . . . .”).
60
According to LexMachina.com, the median time to institution decision in an IPR is 186 days,
while the median time to summary judgment in patent litigation is 601 days.
61
See Unified Challenges the Three Most Prolific Patent Trolls of 2016, July 27, 2016,
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/7/27/unified-challenges-the-three-most-prolificpatent-trolls-of-2016.
62
We collected these statistics by searching LexMachina.com.
63
Shipping & Transit, LLC v. Hall Enters., Inc., No.16-CV-06535, Doc. 32, at *14 (C.D. Cal.,
July 5, 2017) (“Plaintiff’s business model involves filing hundreds of patent infringement
lawsuits, mostly against small companies, and leveraging the high cost of litigation to extract
settlements for amounts less than $50,000.”); Shipping & Transit, LLC v. Lensdiscounters.com,
No. 16-CV-80980, Doc. 52, at *8 (S.D. Fl., July 11, 2017) (noting in support of a fee award that
plaintiff’s “demand letter seeks payment of a $45,000 discounted ‘license fee’” which is
“indicative of a ‘nuisance value settlement’”).
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characteristics of 366 patents that were the subject of validity-related opinions
issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit between 2003 and
2009.64 In a more recent contribution to the literature, Niidome performed a
similar analysis for 267 patents challenged in post-grant proceedings conducted
by the Japanese Patent Office.65
While both studies find a number of statistically significant differences
between patents deemed valid and invalid, their small sample sizes cast doubt
on their ability to adequately control for confounding factors like technology
area and patent age. Perhaps as a result, the two studies’ findings are somewhat
at odds. For example, while Mann and Underweiser find significance in the
number of office actions in a patent’s prosecution history, as well as the number
of citations that were added by the examiner during that process, Niidome finds
no statistical significance in either characteristic.66 Moreover, while both find
significance in the number of technology classifications assigned by the patent
office to an application, the effects they observe point in opposite directions.67
Conflicts like these underscore the need for further research in this area.
In a second quality-related line of investigation, scholars—including
Harhoff and Reitzig68 and Graham et al.69—have studied the characteristics of
patents challenged in EPO opposition proceedings and U.S. reexaminations.
Though such studies benefit from much larger datasets, their relationship to
“quality” is tangential at best because they do not incorporate data on actual
validity determinations, only decisions to seek such determinations. As both
studies readily admit, their findings suggest that challengers (quite rationally)
select relatively “valuable” patents to challenge, but offer little in the way of
predicting which valuable patents are valid and invalid.70

64

Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 7.
Niidome, supra note _, at 168-71.
66
Compare Mann & Underweiser, supra, at 17, with Niidome, supra, at 173.
67
Compare Mann & Underweiser, supra, at 18 (finding that tech class count is a significant
positive predictor of validity), with Niidome, supra, at 175-76 (finding that IPC count is a
significant negative predictor of validity).
68
Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants:
The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 22 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 443 (2004).
69
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of U.S. Patent
Reexaminations and European Patent Oppositions, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 74 (WESLEY M. COHEN & STEPHEN A. MERRILL EDS., 2003).
70
Harhoff & Reitzig, supra, at 443 (“We show empirically that the likelihood of opposition
increases with patent value . . . .”); Graham, et al., supra, at 108 (“In general, the results from
the regressions in columns (1) and (2) confirm the findings by Harhoff and Reitzig (2001) that
variables positively correlated with the value of a patent increase the probability that the patent
will be subject to opposition.”).
65
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Finally, a third line of relevant scholarship analyzes the prosecution of
patent families across multiple patent offices. Both Chien71 and Lei and Wright72
have examined the concurrent prosecution of related applications at the USPTO
and EPO, with a particular focus on applications granted by the former, but
denied by the latter. These studies play an important role in benchmarking patent
office procedures, but they are not without their own limitations. Perhaps most
importantly, both studies measure quality by reference to ex parte examination,
rather than inter partes adjudication. Chien, for example, relies on the EPO’s
reputation as the “gold standard” for high quality patent examination.73 Though
there is good reason to believe that the EPO does in fact provide higher quality
prosecution than the USPTO, there is also good reason to believe that,
nonetheless, the EPO still routinely issues a large number of patents that would
be invalidated if tested by litigants in court. For example, Henkel and Zischka
estimate that a whopping 80 percent of German patents would be at least partially
invalidated if challenged post grant.74
Overall, individually and collectively, these studies leave much to be
desired. Those studies that measure quality most directly and thoroughly suffer
from small sample sizes. At the same time, studies with large samples rely on
noisy quality metrics and compare only a handful of variables drawn from either
the patent or its prosecution history (but not both). In this Article, we aim to
assemble all the pieces of this puzzle: a large sample of patents, a reliable
measure of quality, and a wide array of variables drawn from the patentee, the
patent, and its prosecution history.
II. PATENT EXAMINATION AND POST GRANT REVIEW
In order to analyze the determinants of patent quality, however, we must first
understand how patents come to be, as well as the mechanisms available for
testing their validity after issuance. In this Part we briefly summarize the process
71

Colleen V. Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at *9 (forthcoming 2018)
(comparing “US and EPO patent applications with a priority date in 2002”).
72
Zhen Lei & Brian D. Wright, Why Weak Patents? Testing the Examiner Ignorance Hypothesis,
148 J. PUB. ECON. 43, 44 (2017) (studying “a set of US patents with a USPTO filing date between
1990 and 1995, for which applications were also filed in the Europe Patent Office (EPO) . . . .
[and] us[ing] outcomes from the EPO application process, reflecting not only European laws but
also procedures and traditions distinct from those at the USPTO, as indirect indicators of the
strength of the related US patents”).
73
Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, supra, at *15 (“The EPO is widely recognized as the
‘gold standard’ in patent quality among patent examiners and practitioners.”).
74
Joachim Henkel & Hans Zischka, Why Most Patents are Invalid: Extent, Reasons, and
Potential Remedies of Patent Invalidity, at *3 (Working Paper, June 12, 2015),
https://www.tim.wi.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bcy/www/Research/Publications/Henkel/Henkel_Zis
chka_Patent_Validity.pdf (“We conclude that around 80% or more of all active German patents
are latently invalid, either fully or partially.”).
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of patent examination and post-grant validity challenges, including the policy
choices behind their current incarnations.
A. Patent Examination
Unlike most other forms of intellectual property, patent rights do not
automatically vest at the moment of invention. Rather, U.S. patent rights exist
only when they are granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. To obtain
a patent, an inventor must submit an application to the USPTO that includes a
“specification” describing the invention and one or more “claims” that define
the scope of protection sought. Typically, these materials are prepared by a
patent attorney or “agent” representing the applicant. The application is then
assigned to a patent “examiner” employed by the USPTO who is tasked with
determining whether the application complies with all statutory requirements of
patentability, especially the requirement that all claims be novel and nonobvious.75 If the examiner determines that the claims are overbroad relative to
the body of pre-existing research—the “prior art”76—or relative to the
information disclosed in the specification,77 the examiner will “reject” the
claims. Following a rejection, the applicant may amend the claims or replace
them with entirely new versions and return them for a second look. This backand-forth process of rejections and responses generally plays out multiple times
over the course of several years before any claims are issued in the form of an

75

See Quiang Lu, et al., USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data: Unlocking Office Action
Traits, at *33 (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2017-10, Nov. 2017), available at
https://patentlyo.com/media/2017/11/USPTO-Patent-Prosecution-Research-Data_UnlockingOffice-Action-Traits-1.pdf (showing that obviousness and lack of novelty are the most frequent
grounds for rejection in a sample of more than 4 million USPTO office actions issued between
2008 and 2017).
76
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (denying patent rights for inventions that were “patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention”); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (denying patent rights “if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention
as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”).
77
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (denying patent rights for inventions that lack “a written
description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same”).
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enforceable patent.78 That said, applications that are pursued long enough
overwhelmingly result in the issuance of at least one patent.79
As litigation outcomes attest,80 examination of patent applications is an
imperfect process.81 To at least some extent, this is a rational choice on the part
of patent policymakers.82 As a practical matter, it is all but impossible for patent
examiners to conclusively determine the novelty of the inventions that they
examine. For example, doing so would require them to locate and review every
relevant pre-existing discovery, no matter where in the world it was made or in
what language it was documented.83 Also, even if exhaustive examination were
possible, it would rarely be cost-effective. About one-half of all issued U.S.
patents expire prematurely because their owners fail to pay relatively modest

78

On average in recent years, patents have issued about three years after filing. See U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., Traditional Total Pendency Including RCEs, https://www.uspto.gov/corda/
dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiWithRCE.kpixml (displaying monthly average pendency for patents
issued between October 2015 and December 2017); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Pendency of
Patent Applications, https://developer.uspto.gov/visualization/pendency-patent-applications-2visuals (displaying monthly average pendency for patents issued between October 2008 and
December 2015).
79
On average, about three-quarters of original U.S. patent applications result in at least one
issued patent. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. 101, 102 (2008) (finding in a study of almost 10,000 U.S. patent applications filed
in the month of January 2001 that “approximately 75% of all applications result in at least one
patent”).
80
See, Allison, et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note _, at
1787.
81
See, e.g., Henkel & Zischka, supra note _, at *3.
82
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497
(2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for
society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest additional
resources examining patents that will never be heard from again. In short, the PTO doesn't do a
very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don't want it to”).
83
Under U.S. law, a patent claim lacks novelty if, inter alia, the invention it claims was disclosed
in any prior art “publication” made anywhere else in the world. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Courts have
also broadly defined the concept of “publication” to include documents available in public
libraries and even presentations made at conferences. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 135052 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a slide presentation on a poster presented at a conference may
constitute an invalidating “printed publication”). Thus, for example, a U.S. patent claim can be
invalidated by a single copy of a doctoral thesis that was written in German and is available only
in a German library. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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maintenance fees due periodically after issue.84 Also, history suggests that less
than two percent of issued patents will ever be enforced in court.85
B. High Costs from Low Quality Patents
Since any given patent is likely to languish in obscurity until expiration,
the USPTO’s decision not to conduct scorched-earth examination is a rational
one. That said, there is good reason to believe that patent examination is
presently conducted in a manner that is too cost-conscious.86 U.S. patent
examiners, for example, work under a quota system that requires them to review
applications quickly,87 devoting on average less than 20 hours total per
application.88 Moreover, studies find that examiners largely limit their search for
prior art to indexed databases of published patents, thereby often ignoring the
academic literature, books, and other sources published exclusively online.89
84

See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Maintenance Fees 2015, Patently-O (July 21, 2015)
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/maintenance-fees-2015.html (showing that only 40 to 50
percent of patentees elect to take advantage of the full patent term by making all three
maintenance fee payments required by the USPTO).
85
See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, supra, at 1502 (“[I]t is reasonable
to estimate that at most only about two percent of all patents are ever litigated, and less than twotenths of one percent of all issued patents actually go to court.”).
86
See, e.g., Lei & Wright, supra note _, at 43 (“Among lawyers, economists, policy makers and
businessmen there is a widespread belief that patent examiners at the United States Patent Office
(USPTO) have allowed the grant of too many patents that do not satisfy the statutory criteria for
allowance. Such ‘weak patents’ impose social costs associated with increased uncertainty and
abusive litigation without commensurate social benefits associated with increased innovation
incentives.”).
87
See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Micro-Level
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STATS. 550, 552 (2016) (explaining that the USPTO’s timeper-application expectation “depends on both the technological field in which the examiner is
working and her position in the general schedule (GS) pay scale”).
88
See id. (“On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only nineteen hours reviewing an
application: reading the application, searching for prior art, comparing the prior art with the
application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent applicant’s arguments, and often
conducting an interview with the applicant’s attorney.” (internal citation omitted)). See also
Lemley, supra note _, at 1500 (estimating 18 hours of examiner time per application); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Ch. 5, at 5 (Oct. 2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/
promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-patent-law-policy
(collecting
estimates,
including “24.9 hours at the outside, but often half that; 21 hours; 20 to 25 hours; 18 hours; 8-18
hours; and more than 11-12, but ‘not a lot of hours’ to read and understand the application, search
for prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with the applicant, work out necessary
revisions, and reach and write up conclusions”).
89
See Christopher A. Cotropia, et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y
844, 844 (2013) (finding “patent examiners rarely use applicant-submitted art in their rejections
to narrow patents, relying almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves”).
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The result, many contend, is a proliferation of low quality patents that
impose large costs on innovators and, on net, act to slow rather than spur the
overall pace of innovation. One reason for this concern is the possibility that the
issuance of low quality patents will beget even more low quality patents, and so
on in a vicious cycle.90 This may happen for at least two reasons. First, patenting
firms may feel compelled to seek more patent protection in response to a
perceived decline in patent quality in order to raise the odds that their inventions
are adequately protected.91 Second, an increase in patent filing rates may, in turn,
increase strain on already-overburdened examiners, inducing them to spread
limited examination resources thinner still and, as a consequence, issue patents
of even lower quality.92
Regardless of their raison d’etre, patents of questionable validity can
impose significant costs on actors in the world of innovation who, in the absence
of relatively inexpensive methods for testing patent validity, may often find it
rational to license patents that, if challenged, would be invalidated with high
probability.93 Other times, researchers may decide not to use the patented
technology at all.94 In addition to slowing the pace of research and development
at existing incumbents, inefficiencies like these can also quash entirely new
endeavors. A bulwark of accumulated low quality patents can both deter
entrepreneurs from entering a market in the first place95 and discourage the
combination of complementary technologies to produce new goods or services.96
C. Post-Grant Validity Challenges
To mitigate the costs of imperfect examination, patent systems generally
allow the public to challenge ex post facto the validity of the subset of issued
See Hall & Harhoff, supra note _, at 993-94 (“The issuance of low quality patents is also likely
to spur significant increases in patent applications, further straining the already overburdened
examination processes of the USPTO. A vicious circle may result, in which cursory
examinations of patent applications result in the issue of low quality patents, which triggers rapid
growth in applications, further taxing the limited resources of the USPTO, further limiting the
examination of individual applications, and further degrading the quality of patents.”).
91
See id.at 993 (“[T]he issue of a large number of low quality patents will increase uncertainty
among inventors concerning the level of protection enjoyed by these related inventions . . . .”).
92
See id. at 993-94.
93
See id. at 993 (“[R]esolution of the non-producer’s claims is clearly more costly when the
validity and breadth of the asserted patent can only be determined via expensive litigation. In
that instance, paying licensing fees may be cheaper than going to court, even if the patent in
question is viewed as low quality by the accused infringer.”)
94
See id.at 993 (“If . . . previous technical advances are covered by patents of dubious validity
or uncertain breadth, the costs to inventors of pursuing the inventions that rely on them may be
so high as to discourage such cumulative invention”).
95
See Lerner, surpa note _, at 489-90.
96
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note _.
90
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patents that later prove to be worth the additional effort. Most often, ex post
challenges are made by companies that have been sued for patent infringement
because accused infringers can, and generally do, argue in their defense that the
asserted patent is “invalid” and, thus, never should have been granted. In the
U.S., the defense of invalidity is pled is virtually every patent suit, and
defendants are successful in at least partially invalidating an asserted patent
about 40 percent of the time the issue is litigated to a decision on the merits.97
However, despite the relatively high rate of success, validity decisions are
rare in court cases. In a study of more than 5,000 patent suits filed in 2008 and
2009, Allison et al. found just 430 decisions concerning the validity of asserted
patents. One reason for the dearth of rulings is the simple fact that litigation is
expensive, and defending patent suits is among its most expensive forms.
According to a recent survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, the cost of defending a U.S. patent suit to the point where a
ruling on the merits might be possible generally exceeds $250,000 even for cases
with less than $1 million in potential damages at stake.98 Accordingly, many
accused infringers rationally choose to settle cases enforcing likely invalid
patents simply to avoid the high cost of defense, particularly in countries like the
U.S. where attorney’s fee awards are rare.99 This fact makes it possible for
unscrupulous patentees to enforce weak patents in order to extract nuisancevalue settlements from companies active in the product market,100 a practice
sometimes referred to as patent “trolling.”
In addition, even in the context of good faith patent assertion, an individual
defendant has suboptimal incentives to challenge the validity of the asserted
patent because it will bear the full cost of defense but share the benefit of
invalidation with all its competitors.101 In fact, there is good reason to believe
that defendants sometimes tacitly collude with patent enforcers to buttress the
subsequent assertion of the same patent against the defendants’ competitors.102
97

Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note _ at 1787.
See AIPLA, supra note _, at I-118 (reporting a median cost of $250,000 (and an average of
$306,000) for litigating a patent case with less than $1 million at stake through discovery and
claim construction).
99
See supra note _.
100
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY, supra note _, at 4-5.
101
See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004) (“[F]or instance, if there are five infringers of
equal size, each gets only a fifth of the gains from a successful challenge because each is paying
only a fifth of the patentee's total royalties. Therefore, the patentee has five times more incentive
to prevail in litigation than any one challenger has.”).
102
It is common for repeat patent enforcers to begin assertion campaigns against relatively small,
weak defendants in hopes of obtaining favorable settlements or court victories that will set an
initial “market price” for a license moving forward. See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon,
Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1635 (2013). Initial
98
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One way to increase the likelihood that invalid patents will be eliminated
post-grant is to establish alternative mechanisms for testing the validity of issued
patents that are less expensive and more broadly available than judicial
challenges. One alternative available today in many nations is some form of
administrative patent review undertaken by the country’s patent office. In the
U.S., issued patents can be challenged in court or in one of a variety of “post
grant proceedings,” and in some countries (like China and Germany)
administrative review is the exclusive means for challenging the validity of
issued patents.103
In one form or another, post grant administrative review has been available
in the U.S. since 1981, when a procedure called “ex parte reexamination” was
established to allow the public to “petition” the USPTO to cancel one or more
claims of an issued patent and re-open the examination process between the
USPTO and patentee.104 A second procedure, dubbed “inter partes
reexamination,” was added in 1999, to give petitioners the option of participating
in the subsequent examination process.105
In the years that followed, however, petitions for inter partes reexamination
were filed relatively rarely and ex parte reexamination was seldom used
successfully to eliminate problematic claims,106 leading to a widespread

defendants are often complicit in this process and, for example, may willingly settle for an
artificially high royalty rate applied to an artificially small quantity of sales in hopes that their
competitors will later pay the same rate on all their revenue. See id.
103
For a summary of the procedures for post-grant challenges available in Germany and China,
see Katrin Cremers, et al., Invalid but infringed? An Analysis of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation
System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 218, 221-22 (2016) (describing Germany’s bifurcation
of decisions regarding infringement, which are heard by regional courts, and challenges to
validity, which are heard by the German Federal Patent Court); Brian J. Love, et al., Patent
Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local Economy?, 18 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 713, 721-22 (2016) (describing China’s bifurcation of decisions regarding infringement,
which are typically heard by Intermediate People’s Courts, and validity challenges, which are
heard by SIPO’s Patent Review and Adjudication Board).
104
See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Manual of Patent Examining Procedures [hereinafter MPEP]
§ 2209 (“Procedures for reexamination of issued patents began on July 1, 1981, the date when
the reexamination provisions of Public Law 96-517 came into effect”).
105
Id. at § 2609 (“The inter partes reexamination statute and rules permit any third party requester
to request inter partes reexamination of a patent which issued from an original application was
filed on or after November 29, 1999 . . . .”).
106
Overall, about 87 percent of patents challenged in ex parte reexamination survived, and twothirds were re-issued with new claims. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Ex Parte
Reexamination Filing Data ‐ September 30, 2017, at 2, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. As a result, ex parte re-examination was
often used strategically by patentees to re-write their own issued claims before asserting them.
Id. (reporting that 29 percent of ex parte reexaminations were filed by the challenged patent’s
owner).
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perception that neither procedure provided an efficient alternative to litigation.107
In 2011, Congress responded by passing legislation overhauling the USPTO’s
system for post grant review. While ex parte reexamination was left unchanged,
the America Invents Act (AIA) replaced inter partes reexamination with a suite
of three new procedures for the administrative review of issued patent claims.108
D. Inter Partes Review
Principal among the new procedures is inter partes review (IPR), which
has proven to be far more popular than both its predecessors and contemporaries.
Since it became available in September 2012, parties have filed almost 6,500
petitions for IPR, a figure that exceeds the total number of patent cases filed in
all but one district court during the same period of time,109 as well as the total
number of petitions for inter partes reexamination that were filed during the 13
years that the process was available.110 Relatively speaking, the two other new
forms of administrative challenge created by the AIA—“post grant review”
(PGR) and “covered business method patent” (CBM) review—have been used
infrequently, due in large measure to greater restrictions on their availability.
Post grant reviews must be filed within nine months of a patents’ issuance111 and
are applicable only to patents with priority dates on or after March 16, 2013. To
date, fewer than one hundred PGRs have been filed.112 Covered business method
107

See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 95 (2014) (“Though originally developed to serve as a costeffective alternative to full-blown litigation, reexaminations rarely realized that goal. Rather,
reexamination developed a well-deserved reputation for lengthy delays, a lack of decisive results,
and a permissiveness for claim amendments that led some in the patent bar to view reexamination
more as a vehicle for patentees to strengthen their patent rights post hoc than as a tool for possible
infringers to quickly and cheaply eliminate invalid claims without resorting to litigation.”).
108
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
109
According to LexMachina.com, 8,406 patent suits were filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas between September 16, 2012 and the end of 2017. The next most
popular district, the District of Delaware, saw just 4,506 patent suits during the same period.
110
A total of 1,919 petitions for inter partes reexamination were filed between 1999 and 2012,
an average of less than 13 per month. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data ‐ September 30, 2017,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. Less than 14,000 petitions for
ex parte re-examination have been filed since 1981, an average of about 32 per month. U.S. Pat.
& Trademark Off., Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, supra. In recent years, petitions for
review by the PTAB have been filed at a rate of approximately 150 per month. See, e.g., Unified
Patents, Inc., 2017 Patent Dispute Report: Year in Review (Dec. 30, 2017),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2017/12/26/2017-patent-dispute-report-year-in-review
(reporting that an average of 449 petitions per quarter were filed in 2017).
111
35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (“A petition for a post-grant review may only be filed not later than the
date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent . . . .”).
112
Docket Navigator, Inc., https://www.docketnavigator.com/ (search conducted Aug. 1, 2017).
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patent reviews, as their name suggests, apply only to patents that claim a
“business method”—that is, “a method or corresponding apparatus for
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
administration, or management of a financial product or service”113—and must
be filed by a party with standing to challenge the patent in court.114 About 500
petitions for CBM review have been filed to date. IPRs, by contrast, may be
filed against any patent that is more than nine months old and may be brought
by any party, whether or not they have been sued or threatened with suit.
Compared to its predecessors, IPR proceeds much more quickly and ends
with greater finality. Unlike reexaminations, which merely initiated yet another
opened-ended examination of the challenged claims by USPTO examiners, IPRs
take place on a tight schedule and are decided by Administrative Patent Judges
(APJs) sitting on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The AIA mandates
that the PTAB must decide whether to grant—or “institute”—a petition within
six months of filing,115 and if a petition is instituted the PTAB must issue a final
decision on the patentability of the challenged claims within one year of the
institution decision.116 The result is a decision that is not only much faster than
inter partes reexamination, which had a median time-to-termination of about
three years,117 but also far faster than is typically possible in court, where trials
take place on average well over two years after a complaint for patent
infringement is filed.118
Compared to reexamination, IPRs also offer petitioners a higher likelihood
of finality. Patentees facing reexamination were permitted to amend their claims
as a matter of course, and as a result, the most common outcome of a
reexamination was the issuance of a new set of amended claims that could be
asserted against the petitioner.119 Though claim amendments are technically
permitted in IPRs, the PTAB has to date denied all but a handful of motions to
amend.120 Moreover, when petitions for IPR are litigated to a decision on the
merits, the PTAB has frequently elected to review and cancel all challenged

113

37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a).
37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (“A petitioner may not file with the Office a petition to institute a
covered business method patent review of the patent unless the petitioner . . . has been sued for
infringement of the patent or . . . . a real and substantial controversy regarding infringement of a
covered business method patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action in Federal court.”).
115
35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
116
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
117
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, supra.
118
According to LexMachina.com, the median time-to-trial for patent cases filed between 2005
and 2016 is 810 days.
119
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, supra; U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, supra.
120
Docket Navigator, Inc., https://www.docketnavigator.com/ (search conducted Aug. 1, 2017).
114

[Draft v. 2/7/2018]

PTAB and Patent Quality

26

claims, leaving nothing behind for the patentee to subsequently assert.121 On the
flip side, when claims are upheld, patentees also benefit from a broad estoppel
provision that prevents challengers from raising the same invalidity arguments
again in court.122 As a result, IPR often operates as a one-time “up or down”
vote on the validity of challenged claims.
i.

Procedural Overview,

IPR includes a first round of briefing and a decision from the Board on
whether or not to institute the petition, followed by a second round of briefing,
a hearing, and finally a decision from the Board on the patentability of
challenged claims. First, a party wishing to challenge a patent must file a petition
that establishes a “reasonable likelihood” of invalidating at least one of the
patent’s claims.123 As with reexamination, petitions are limited to arguments
that the patent is invalid for lack of novelty or as obvious in light of prior patents
or other “printed publications.”124 Once a petition is filed, the owner of the
challenged patent is given three months to prepare and file a “preliminary
response,” but the patentee is not required to do so.125
The patent owner is free to end the review at any time by unilaterally
canceling its challenged (or, later, instituted) claims. Likewise, the parties are
also free to settle on confidential terms at any time,126 and to date about onethird of IPRs have concluded with a settlement.127 The PTAB has discretion to
proceed with its determination of validity despite a settlement, but in practice, it
has done so very rarely.128

121

See Unified Patents, Inc., Case Level Analytics by Status and Phase,
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/analytics/case-level/by-status-and-phase (last accessed
Jan. 13, 2018) [hereinafter “Unified Patents Case Level Analytics”].
122
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that
results in a final written decision . . . may not assert either in a civil action . . . that the claim is
invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter
partes review.”).
123
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
124
35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section
102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”).
125
35 U.S.C. § 313; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107.
126
35 U.S.C. § 317; 37 C.F.R. § 42.74.
127
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
128
See Stephen Kenney, When Joint Settlement Agreements Do Not Settle, PTAB Blog (Oct. 20,
2015), http://www.ptab-blog.com/2015/10/20/when-joint-settlement-agreements-do-not-settle/
(“Under 37 CFR 42.74, parties to a trial before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) may
mutually agree to terminate the proceeding. However, the PTAB is not a party to the settlement
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By statute, the PTAB must issue a decision within six months of the
petition’s filing as to whether the petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood
of success. If the petitioner has met that burden for at least one challenged claim,
the review is considered instituted and continues for all claims that the Board
has deemed likely invalid. Institution decisions are final and non-appealable.129
At this point, if the challenged patent has been asserted in court, it is
common for the petitioner to request that litigation be stayed pending the
review’s final outcome. District courts have broad discretion to stay the cases
before them in the interests of efficiency, including to await the resolution of
independent proceedings, like IPRs.130 Post-institution, courts are generally
receptive to such motions and grant them roughly 80 percent of the time, though
grant rates vary significantly from district to district.131 Some courts are
additionally receptive to motions to stay suits filed against other accused
infringers in addition to the suit filed against the successful petitioner. To similar
effect, in situations where an instituted patent has been asserted against
numerous parties, it is also common for other defendants to file copy-cat
petitions that substantially crib from the one that was just instituted.
Overwhelmingly, these “me too” petitions are quickly instituted and joined to
the original.132
Again by statute, PTAB must issue a final written decision within one year
of the institution decision and, thus, within a total of 18 months from the date of
petition. By contrast, a litigant is unlikely to get a substantive ruling on validity
and . . . . in select instances the PTAB has elected to continue the proceeding despite a joint
motion to terminate by the Parties.”).
129
See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the Director [of the Patent Office] whether to
institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”); Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016) (holding that section 314 “may not bar
consideration of a constitutional question” but nonetheless “does bar judicial review of the kind
of mine-run claim at issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes
review”).
130
See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must *255 weigh competing
interests and maintain an even balance.”).
131
In cases between the same parties to the IPR, grant rates are especially high when motions
are filed after the IPR is instituted. See Love & Ambwani, supra note _, at 103 (“Of patent suits
proceeding in parallel with an instituted IPR between the same parties, a motion to stay was filed
in over 76 percent. Overall, these cases were stayed (at least in part) 82 percent of the time,
though rates varied considerably across districts”). Overall, including motions filed by other
parties in other cases, as well as motions filed by the petitioner pre-institution, the grant rate is a
bit more modest. DocketNavigator.com reports an overall grant rate of about 69 percent for
motions to stay pending inter partes review.
132
According to DocketNavigator.com, the PTAB has granted about 80 percent of motions for
joinder or consolidation of challenges.
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from a court until at least a few months later,133 and often much, much longer.
Immediately following institution, the patent owner is allotted three months to
conduct discovery and file a post-institution response to the petition and a motion
to amend.134 Afterwards, the petitioner is given three months to conduct its own
discovery and file a reply.135 Finally, the patent owner may conduct one more
month of discovery and file a sur-reply of its own.136
The petitioner may also file a motion to amend the challenged claims at the
time of its response.137 However, unlike in reexamination where amendments
were permitted as a matter of course, motions to amend in inter partes reviews
have been granted only a handful of times138 and, for all practical purposes, are
de facto prohibited.
IPRs culminate in oral hearings held before a panel of three APJs. Though
often called “trials,” these hearings do not include live testimony and share much
more in common with appellate arguments than trials. Sometime after the
hearing—typically just before the statutory deadline—the panel will issue a final
written decision on the validity of the instituted claims. Final written decisions
may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,139 but
appeals from PTAB are reviewed with deference to the Board’s decision and are
affirmed across the board at very high rates (about three-quarters of the time to
date).140
If any instituted claims survive review, the petitioner is thereafter estopped
from challenging them again in court on grounds that the petitioner raised “or
reasonably could have raised” in the IPR.141 Though written in broad terms, the
IPR estoppel provision does not completely prohibit unsuccessful petitioners
from challenging the validity of surviving claims in subsequent litigation. For
133

According to LexMachina.com, the median time to summary judgement in patent cases filed
since 2000 is about 600 days.
134
37 C.F.R. § 42.120.
135
See, e.g., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Trials, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials (last accessed Jan. 22, 2018) (showing a timeline of
PTAB trial deadlines).
136
Id.
137
37 C.F.R. § 42.121.
138
See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Trial and Appeal Board Motion to Amend Study 46, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PTAB%20MTA%20Study%20%203%
20%20update%20through%2020170930.pdf (reporting that as of September 30, 2017 motions
to amend were filed in just 8 percent of all PTAB challenges and that only 14 total motions to
amended have been granted in whole or in part).
139
35 U.S.C. § 319.
140
According to DocketNavigator.com, appeals of PTAB decisions have been affirmed about 87
percent of the time.
141
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final
written decision . . . may not assert either in a civil . . . or in a proceeding before the International
Trade Commission . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”).
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one, estoppel applies only to arguments based on evidence that is admissible in
an IPR—i.e., prior art publications. Thus, a petitioner may still argue in court
that surviving patent claims lack novelty or are obvious in light of prior public
sales or uses, rather than publications. In addition, an unsuccessful petitioner
may raise in court a number of other bases for invalidity, including failure to
satisfy the “utility,” “written description,” or “enablement” requirements.
Nonetheless, due to the effect of estoppel, petitioners that fear (or are currently
facing) assertion of the challenged patent in court have a strong incentive to take
their best shot at invalidating the patent on novelty and non-obviousness grounds
before the PTAB.142
ii.

PTAB Proceedings vs. Court Proceedings

Challenging a patent’s validity in an IPR has a number of advantages for
the challenger relative to a validity challenge heard in court. For one, patent
claims can be cancelled in an IPR upon a showing by a mere “preponderance of
the evidence” that they lack novelty or are obvious,143 while patents are
presumed to be valid in court proceedings and, thus, must be proven invalid by
“clear and convincing evidence.”144 In addition, while patent claims asserted in
court are interpreted according to their “ordinary and customary meaning” to a
person of ordinary skill in the art when infringement and validity analysis is
performed,145 patent claims challenged in IPRs are given their “broadest
reasonable construction” when compared to the prior art cited by petitioners.146
Finally, as discussed above, IPRs in most instances promise faster and cheaper
resolution. That said, IPRs are far from cheap in absolute terms. USPTO filing

Estoppel applies not only to the named petitioner, but also to the “real party in interest” (RPI)
behind the petitioner if another entity is actually in control. However, PTAB has ruled that thirdparties can file IPRs without estopping their members as long as members do not control which
IPRs are filed and how those IPRs are litigated. Unified Patents, Inc. v. American Vehicular
Sciences, LLC, IPR2016-00364 (June 27, 2016 Decision to Institute Inter Partes Review).
143
35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
144
See supra note _.
145
See Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he words
of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. We have made clear,
moreover, that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as
of the effective filing date of the patent application.” (internal quotations marks and citations
omitted)).
146
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent that will not expire before a final
written decision is issued shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears.”).
142
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fees alone for an instituted IPR are $30,500,147 and median legal fees required to
pursue an IPR to a final decision are estimated to be about $275,000.148
iii.

Controversy Surrounding PTAB Proceedings

To date, commentary on IPR has primarily focused on the procedure’s high
claim “kill rate.” Numerous studies have documented the relatively high (though
declining) rate of institution (79 percent of decisions on the merits),149 as well as
the fact that most IPRs that reach a final determination conclude with the
cancellation of all instituted claims (70 percent of final written decisions).150
The high rate of claim cancellation in particular has attracted an enormous
amount of attention, including fierce criticism from lobbies for patent owners,
especially those representing the interest of biotech and pharmaceutical
companies. Randall Rader, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, went as far as describing APJs as “acting as death squads,
killing property rights,”151 and some observers have voiced concerns that IPR
may be detrimental to the proper functioning of the patent system and innovation
more broadly.152 Indeed, a bipartisan group of Senators has twice introduced
legislation that, if enacted, would make drastic changes to PTAB practice
designed to benefit patent owners.153 PTAB procedures have been attacked in
the courts as well, where patent owners have argued that various aspects of
147

U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Fee Schedule, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#PTAB Fees (last accessed Jan. 14, 2018)
(showing a $15,500 “[i]nter partes review request fee” and a $15,000 “[i]nter partes review postinstitution fee”).
148
AIPLA, supra note _, at _.
149
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
150
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _. Overall, about 68 percent of claims that
were the subject of an institution decision (on the merits of the petition) have been instituted,
and about 82 percent of instituted claims that were the subject of a final written decision were
cancelled. Id.
151
Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill,
Bloomberg BNA, Oct. 29, 2013.
152
See, e.g., Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, Wall St. J., June 10, 2015 (“The
PTAB could devastate innovation-intensive industries.”); Alden Abbott, et al., Crippling the
Innovation Economy: Regulatory Overreach at the Patent Office, https://regproject.org/paper/
crippling-innovation-economy-regulatory-overreach-patent-office/ (“The PTAB administrative
tribunal is creating unnecessary costs for inventors and companies, and thus it is harming the
innovation economy far beyond the harm of the bad patents it was created to remedy.”).
153
See Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act, S.
632, 114th Cong. (2015); Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and
Economic Resilience (STRONGER) Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2017). For a
summary of the bills’ provisions, see Sen. Chris Coons, The STRONGER Patents Act of 2017:
Section by Section, https://www.coons.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/STRONGER%20Patents%
20Act%20of%202017%20Section-By-Section.pdf.
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PTAB practice either exceed congressional authority, or are altogether
unconstitutional.154
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Rather than focus directly on this long-running debate, however, we take a
step back and ask what more than four years’ of decisions issued by the PTAB
can teach us about the determinants of patent validity. As described in greater
detail below, we take advantage of IPR’s popularity and relatively low
settlement rate to compare the characteristics of over 2,500 patents that were the
subject of at least one “institution” decision issued by the PTAB between its
founding in September 2012 and the end of January 2017. Here, we identify the
sources of our data and explain our methodology.
A.

Inter Partes Review Petition-Level Data

To learn what PTAB outcomes can tell us about patent quality, we set out
to gather as much data as we could on individual petitions and the patents
challenged therein. We began by obtaining data on PTAB proceedings from
Unified Patents, Inc., which maintains a commercial database of PTAB statistics
and filings.155 Unified Patents provided us with petition-level data that allowed
us to identify the patent challenged in each proceeding, as well as the
proceeding’s filing date, the date and outcome of all PTAB decisions, and the
date and reason for each petition’s termination. Our data includes all petitions
filed through January 31, 2017.
As shown below in Table 1, our data includes 5,829 petitions, 4,903 of
which were litigated to (at least) an institution decision. A small, but noteworthy
share of institution denials were based not on the merits of the validity arguments
raised in the petition, but instead on a procedural defect.156 Excluding these,

154

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in two cases that were argued in
October Term 2017. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, No. 16712, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/oil-states-energy-services-llc-v-greenes-energ
y-group-llc/ (raising the issue “[w]hether inter partes review . . . violates the Constitution by
extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury”); SAS
Institute Inc. v. Matal, No. 16-969, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sas-instituteinc-v-lee/ (raising the issue “[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) . . . requires th[e Patent Trial and
Appeal] Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or
whether it allows that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of
only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner”).
155
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
156
A party seeking IPR of a patent asserted against it in court must, by statute, file a petition
within one year of being sued. 35 USC § 315(b). If a party fails to seek IPR within that one-year
window, its petition will be denied as untimely. The PTAB also may deny a petition without
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leaves us with 3,920 petitions, challenging a total of 2,532 unique patents, that
were reviewed on their merits by the PTAB.
TABLE 1. PTAB DATA OVERVIEW (9/16/2012-1/31/2017)
Petitions
Pending, Pre-institution
Settled, Pre-institution
Adv. Judgment, Pre-institution
Other, Pre-institution
Institution Decisions
Granted157
Denied – Merits
Denied – Procedural
Unique (Utility158) Patents
Petitioned
Subject of Inst. Decision(s) on Merits
Always Granted
Always Denied
Both Granted and Denied

5,829
39
823
24
43

100%
0.67%
14.1%
0.41%
0.74%

4,903
3,403
1,164
336

84.1%
69%
24%
7%

3,920
2,532
1680
671
181

100%
65%
66%
27%
7%

Only about 40 percent of these patents were the subject of a final written
decision issued by January 2017. The large drop in the number of decisions is a
result of two factors. The first is a pipeline effect caused by the fact that final
written decisions are typically not issued until very close to one year after their
corresponding institution decision. The second reason is settlement. Overall,
about one-third of PTAB petitions settle, and about half of settlements take place
after an institution decision has been issued.159
In those petitions litigated to a final written decision, the PTAB
overwhelmingly decided to cancel at least one instituted claim. Overall, final
written decisions have cancelled about 82 percent of the instituted claims they
reviewed, and about 73 percent of final written decisions issued to date cancelled
all instituted claims.160 Indeed, it is our experience that parties to PTAB

reaching its merits on the grounds that it is substantially duplicative of an earlier-filed petition.
35 USC § 325(d).
157
This total includes [362] petitions that were instituted and immediately joined to another
already-instituted petition.
158
We additionally excluded from our analysis a small number of petitions challenging design
patents.
159
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
160
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _. While this rate is high, it is hardly
surprising. Final written decisions are decided by the same panel of APJs that voted less than a
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proceedings generally view the institution decision as the most consequential
decision in a PTAB proceeding. Instituted claims, it is generally assumed, will
be cancelled if competently litigated to a conclusion and, thus, an institution
decision alone is often sufficient to destroy the majority of a claim’s licensing
value. Indeed, as depicted in Figure 1, it is increasingly likely for PTAB
proceedings to settle shortly before or shortly after the institution decision.
FIGURE 1.: MONTHLY AVERAGE DAYS FROM PETITION TO SETTLEMENT
450

350
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150

50

B.

PTAB Institution as a Quality Filter

Consistent with the pivotal role that we observe institution playing in
PTAB practice, we use merits-based institution decisions in this study as our
(primary) indicator of patent quality. That is, broadly speaking, we assume that
challenged patents that were flagged by a panel as having at least one likely
invalid claim are of relatively “low quality” while patents that were challenged
but never instituted on any claims are of relatively “high quality.” While we
explain our precise classification methodology in greater detail immediately
below, we first pause here to explain why we believe that institution decisions
are a valid quality filter.
For one, as explained above, we believe that a focus on institution
decisions accurately reflects the current state of patent practice.
Overwhelmingly, instituted claims are cancelled in final written decisions, and
year prior to institute the petition on the grounds that the very same claims were shown to be
unpatentable to a “reasonable likelihood.”
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IPRs frequently settle just before or after an institution decision is issued. We
also believe that employing institution decisions as a quality filter is
advantageous for two additional reasons. First, we believe that institution
decisions reflect with a high degree of accuracy whether or not the challenged
patent claims should have originally been granted. An instituted petition has
demonstrated to the satisfaction of a panel of Administrative Patent Judges that
the challenged patent includes at least one claim that likely should not have been
issued.161 Unlike decisions made in court, PTAB decisions employ the same
interpretive rules, legal standard, and burden of proof applicable in ex ante
examination.162 Moreover, all APJs have a technical degree in science or
engineering, as well as experience working as a patent examiner or patent lawyer
(if not both),163 and thus may be better positioned than judges or juries to
understand both patentees’ inventions and the prior art raised by petitioners.164
Second, we believe that institution decisions likely suffer from fewer
selection effects than validity decisions rendered by courts. While we
acknowledge that patents challenged in PTAB proceedings are highly selected,
there is good reason to believe that challenged patents are less selected than
patents litigated to a decision by a judge or jury.165 For one, a PTAB challenge
161

Moreover, almost all decisions issued by panels are unanimous. See Scott McKeown, PTAB
Dissents, Patents Post Grant (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/judicialindependence-ptab/#more-12559 (reporting that 98 percent of all PTAB institution decisions and
final written decisions are unanimous).
162
See MPEP § 2111 (“Patented claims are not given the broadest reasonable interpretation
during court proceedings involving infringement and validity, and can be interpreted based on a
fully developed prosecution record. In contrast, an examiner must construe claim terms in the
broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is reasonably allowed in an effort to establish
a clear record of what applicant intends to claim.”).
163
See David Ruschke, State of the Board After 5 Years (Nov. 16, 2017) (copy on file with the
authors) (noting that APJs have technical degrees in addition to law degrees, with more than 10
percent of APJs holding a PhD, about 27 percent holding a master’s degree in a technical field,
and about 32 percent having prior experience working as a USPTO patent examiner).
164
See, e.g., Michael Goodman, What’s So Special about Patent Law?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797 (2016) (arguing that PTAB should become the exclusive forum
for validity challenges because “the difficult portion of a patent case is the technology” and APJs
have “the necessary expertise to deal with that technology”). See also Gen. Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1974) (“This patent appeal is another
illustration of the absurdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges whose
knowledge of the relevant technology derives primarily, or even solely, from explanations of
counsel and who, unlike the judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, do not have
access to a scientifically knowledgeable staff.”).
165
To be clear, though we believe that the population of petitioned patents suffers from less
selection bias than the population of litigated patents, we also acknowledge that petitioned
patents are nonetheless still a highly selected group and, thus, different from the population of
granted patents. Consistent with the literature showing a connection between litigation and
private value, we suspect that the principal difference between petitioned patents as a group and
the population of all U.S. patents is that the former have greater private value.
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is much more likely that a lawsuit to lead to a decision on the merits. In an
analysis of the more than 5,100 patent suits filed in U.S. courts in 2008-2009,
Allison et al. found just 430 validity decisions.166 By contrast, the more than
5,800 PTAB IPR petitions in our data set generated institution decisions for
2,532 unique patents and many of these petitions are still pending.
In addition, there is good reason to believe that the set of patent disputes
worth litigating to a decision on the merits is a subset of the patent disputes worth
challenging before PTAB. Though it is true that just fifteen percent of patents
asserted in court are challenged at PTAB,167 an even smaller percentage of patent
suits are litigated to a motion for summary judgment.168 We believe that cases
traditionally falling in the latter category are likely today to fall in the first as
well. Simply put, disputes worth litigating for two to three years at a cost well
north of $1 million are, with high probability, also worth challenging at PTAB
for 18 months and closer to $250,000.
Finally, at least some patent disputes that aren’t worth litigating to a
decision nonetheless still are worth challenging at PTAB. In addition to the fact
that PTAB proceedings are simply less expensive than litigation, IPR’s lack of
a standing requirement allows potential infringers to pool resources in third party
organizations—like defensive aggregators and industry associations—that can
challenge especially weak patents previously asserted en masse for nuisance
value.169 For example, in 2016 Unified Patents instituted a challenge against a
patent owned by Shipping & Transit, LLC (f/k/a ArrivalStar, LLC), which had
previously filed hundreds of patent suits with an average time to termination of
just 114 days.170 Though few parties would elect to defend a lawsuit that could
be settled for a five-figure sum, third party organizations that serve the interests
of dozens or hundreds of potential lawsuit targets often will have the incentive
to launch a PTAB challenge. In addition, roughly fifteen percent of PTAB
proceedings challenge a patent that has never been asserted in court. 171 Such

166

Allison, et al., supra note _ at 1778.
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
168
Lex Machina, Inc., https://lexmachina.com/ (search conducted July 27, 2017).
169
See Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response
to Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End-User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1075, 1094
n.59 (2015) (“A small but growing number of IPRs have been filed by industry groups (like the
Printing Industries of America), public interest organizations (like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation), and membership-based patent risk management firms (like RPX and Unified
Patents). By pooling resources ex ante, these groups also help mitigate the collective action
problem that arises when multiple purchasers, rather than one manufacturer, is faced with
infringement allegations.”). To date, Unified Patents and RPX have collectively filed 175
petitions for inter partes review. Lex Machina, Inc., https://lexmachina.com/ (search conducted
Jan. 23, 2018).
170
Lex Machina, Inc., https://lexmachina.com/ (search conducted July 27, 2017).
171
Unified Patents Case Level Analytics, supra note _.
167

[Draft v. 2/7/2018]

PTAB and Patent Quality

36

challenges may happen for a variety of reasons and, thus, allow us to observe the
validity of patents that otherwise may never have been selected for litigation.
C.

Classifying High- and Low-Quality Patents

Accordingly, we chose merits-based institution decisions to classify
patents as either “high” or “low” quality. While we could have instead
categorized patents using only the outcomes of PTAB final written decisions,
we chose not to because doing so would have substantially reduced the size of
our sample, while at the same time increasing selection effects. Though we feel
confident in this choice given the high rate of claim cancellation observed in
final written decisions, it is nonetheless possible for a final written decision to
confirm the patentability of all instituted claims and, in effect, “reverse” the
institution decision. While this is rare, it does happen from time and time. To
correct for these “reversals,” we re-classified petitions as “not instituted” if all
instituted claims were upheld in a final written decision.
With that correction made, as shown above in Table 1, the population of
patents that were the subject of at least one merits-based institution decision can
be divided into three sets: (i) 1,680 patents that were instituted every time they
were the subject of an institution decision, i.e., patents that were “always
instituted,” (ii) 671 patents that were not instituted every time they were the
subject of an institution decision, i.e., patents that were “never instituted,” and
(iii) 181 patents that both were instituted at least once on the merits and were not
instituted at least once on the merits.
In the analyses described below, we consolidate these three sets in two
ways to compare patents that are of relatively “high” and relatively “low”
quality. First, we create a dichotomous variable that compares the set of 671
patents that were “never instituted” (and thus of relatively high quality) to the
set of 1,861 patents that were instituted at least once (and thus of relatively low
quality). This comparison, broadly speaking, compares patents that passed
PTAB scrutiny with flying colors against patents with at least one challenged
claim that appears to have been issued erroneously.
While such a comparison is useful from a policy perspective—after all, in
an ideal world, the USPTO would only issue valid claims—it is arguably the
wrong comparison to make from a practical perspective. Victory in a patent
enforcement action requires a finding of infringement of just a single valid claim.
Thus, a patent with one rock-solid claim can remain a significant hurdle to
competitors despite containing numerous additional claims that are likely
invalid. With this consideration in mind, we created a second dichotomous
variable that compares the set of patents that were not instituted on the merits at
least once (and thus of relatively high quality) with the set of patents that were
“always instituted” (and thus of relatively low quality). This comparison is
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marginally more practical in that it compares patents that withstood at least one
well-funded validity challenge against those that fell at least in part each time
they were scrutinized.
That said, one limitation to our study is that we lack data on patent claimlevel outcomes. For practical reasons related to the difficulty inherent in
collecting such data from court filings, we did not track the fate of each
individual patent claim that was challenged. Thus, we lack the ability to identify
patents that were instituted at least once on each and every challenged claim,
despite surviving at least one petition among many. Similarly, we are unable to
identify patents that survived IPR with at least one challenged claim intact,
despite being instituted each time a petition was filed. We hope in future
iterations of this study to expand our analysis to include claim level comparisons.
D.

Patent-Level Data Collection Methodology

With our patents classified by quality, we next collected as much patentlevel data as possible that might predict in some way a patent’s quality. The data
that we collected falls into five broad categories: (i) characteristics of the patent’s
applicant, prosecution counsel, and examiner; (ii) the type of technology that the
patent relates to; (iii) the complexity of the patent document itself; (iv) the
intensity of the patent’s prosecution and examination; and (v) attributes that the
patent acquired over time post-grant. Unless otherwise indicated, we queried the
data described below from the USPTO’s recently released “PatentsView”172 and
“PatEx”173 databases.
PatentsView is a relational database that links individual U.S. patent numbers (“patent_id”)
to, inter alia, data on patent assignees, claims, inventors, lawyers, reverse citations, and
technology classifications. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., FAQs, http://www.patentsview.org/
api/faqs.html. We downloaded a copy of the database, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Data
Download Tables, http://www.patentsview.org/download/, and queried it using SQL scripts. Our
scripts are available online at [we will post them prior to publication]. PatentsView can now be
queried directly via Google’s BigQuery platform. See Ian Wetherbee, Google Patents Public
Datasets: Connecting Public, Paid, and Private Patent Data, Google Cloud Big Data & Machine
Learning Blog (Oct. 31, 2017), https://cloud.google.com/blog/big-data/2017/10/google-patentspublic-datasets-connecting-public-paid-and-private-patent-data.
173
PatEx is a relational database that links individual U.S. patent application numbers
(“application_number”) to, inter alia, data on patent examiners, parent applications, child
applications, and “events” that occurred during prosecution. Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., The
USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset: A Window on the Process of Patent Examination
(November 30, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2702637. We downloaded a copy of the
database, See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Examination Research Dataset (Public PAIR),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patent-examinationresearch-dataset-public-pair, and queried it using SQL scripts. Our scripts are available online
at [we will post them prior to publication]. This data can now be queried directly via Google’s
BigQuery platform. See Wetherbee, supra.
172
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Applicant, Prosecutor, and Examiner

The first category of data that we collected pertains to the people and
entities that controlled each patent’s filing and examination. In addition to
identifying each patent’s applicant, we noted whether the applicant claimed
“small entity” status at the time of filing in order to receive fee discounts
available to business with fewer than 500 employees.174 We also hand-classified
each applicant as: one or more individuals (typically the patent’s inventor(s)), a
for-profit business entity (typically the employer of inventors working in a
corporate research setting), a university or university-affiliated entity (typically
the employer of inventors working in an academic research setting),175 or,
finally, a government department or government-run research lab (typically the
employer of inventors working in a non-academic basic research setting).176
We next identified the people or entities selected by each applicant to
prosecute the application from which each patent issued. We then categorized
each application as prosecuted by one or more of the patent’s inventors (i.e.,
prosecuted “pro se”), by lawyers employed by the applicant (i.e., by the
applicant’s “in-house” legal team), or by lawyers employed by an outside law
firm. For each application prosecuted by a law firm, we additionally categorized
the firm by size, measured by the number of attorneys employed by the firm.177
For this purpose, we adopted the size classifications used by the AIPLA in its
biannual Report of the Economic Survey, which groups firms into the following
categories: “large” firms, which employ 60 or more attorneys; “medium” firms,
which employ 16 to 59 attorneys; “small” firms, which employ 4 to 15 attorneys;
and “solo” practices, which employ 3 or fewer attorneys.178
Finally, we identified the USPTO examiner who was assigned to examine
the application from which each patent issued. For each examiner, we also
identified the examiner’s level of “experience,” measured by the total number of
applications that the examiner had examined in his or her career. Building on
this data point, we next calculated the examiner’s overall “allowance rate,” the
percentage of each examiner’s applications that were granted. We then identified

13 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (“A concern eligible for reduced patent fees is one . . . [w]hose number
of employees, including affiliates, does not exceed 500 persons . . . .”).
175
In addition to universities, we included in this category about two dozen affiliated non-profit
entities. There were primarily university-affiliated hospitals.
176
Because we found just five government patents we do not separately discuss them below.
177
We primarily collected this information by visiting each’s firm website. In some instances,
firms had merged with others since the time of prosecution. In those circumstances, we
attempted to the best of our ability to determine the size of the firm before the merger. Often this
was possible by locating press releases announcing the merger.
178
See, e.g., AIPLA, supra note _, at I-93.
174
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the “art unit” in which each examiner worked,179 and similarly calculated each
art unit’s overall allowance rate. Finally, using both examiner and art unit
allowance rates, we calculated each examiner’s relative allowance rate—i.e., the
differential between each examiner’s individual allowance rate and the average
allowance rate across all other examiners working in his or her respective art
unit.
ii.

Technology Area

Next, we collected data about the technological focus and scope of each
challenged patent. First, we collected data on the number and type(s) of
technology “classifications” assigned to the patent, including those classes and
subclasses assigned under the USPTO’s “U.S. Patent Classification System,” the
USPTO and EPO’s joint “Cooperative Classification System.” and the WIPO’s
“International Patent Classification System.”180 Using these classifications, we
further defined a set of “pharmaceutical” patents,181 a set of “business method”
patents,182 and a set of “software” patents.183 Finally, to supplement these classbased categories, we additionally hand classified each patent as broadly related
to “high tech,” i.e., computing and telecommunications; “medical” technology,
i.e., pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and medical devices; or some “other”
technology.184
iii.

Specification and Claims

We next collected data related to the length and complexity of various parts
of the patent document itself. For each patent, we identified its total number of
claims, as well as the number of independent and dependent claims. We also
determined the length (measured by word count) of various parts of each patent
document, including each patent’s abstract, specification, and claims. Finally, to
U.S. patent examiners are divided into nine “technology centers,” each of which is subdivided
into a number of “work units” that, in turn, are further subdivided into “art units.” See Patent
Technology Centers, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/
phone_directory/pat_tech.
180
See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Classification Standards and Development,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-search/classification-standards-anddevelopment.
181
We define “pharmaceutical” patents as those assigned USPC 514 or 424.
182
We define “business method” patents as those assigned to USPC 705 or any USPC in the
range 718 to 726.
183
Following Bessen, we define “software” patents as those assigned to any of the following
USPCs: 341, 345, 370, 375, 380, 381, 382, 700-707, 715-717, 726, and 902. James Bessen, A
Generation of Software Patents at *14 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research
Paper No. 11-31, 2011).
184
Such as manufacturing, industrial, and oil and gas related technologies.
179
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correct for the common repetition of words or phrases in claim language, we
took the additional step of noting the number of unique words that appear in each
patent’s first (and typically principal) claim.
iv.

Prosecution History and Family

Turning from patent documents to prosecution histories, we next collected
a number of data points about each patent’s examination. First, we took the
simple step of noting the date on which each patent’s application was filed, the
filing date of the earliest prior application to which it claimed priority, and the
date on which the application was granted. From this data, we calculated each
patent’s “pendency,” i.e., the duration of the patent’s prosecution history.
We next identified all prior art references that were cited during the
patent’s prosecution (often referred to as “reverse citations”). In addition to
determining the overall count of such citations, we also determined the number
of reverse citations to foreign patents, as well as the number and type of reverse
citations to “non-patent literature” (NPL) such as academic articles, books, and
websites. Finally, for all patents issued in 2001 or thereafter, we were
additionally able to determine whether reverse citations to patents and
applications were disclosed by the applicant or, instead, were identified and cited
by the examiner in an office action.185
In addition to the documents cited during prosecution, we were able to
search USPTO records to identify whether (and if so, how often) certain actions
were taken by the applicant or examiner during prosecution. For example, we
identified whether the applicant disclosed prior references to the examiner in an
“information disclosure statement,” and if so how many times. Similarly, we
identified whether, and if so how many times, the examiner “rejected” the
application in an office action. In addition, in response to a “final” rejection (if
any) we noted whether the applicant filed a “request for continued examination”
or, alternatively, filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.
We also noted whether each patent’s application was published prior to
issuance.186 If so, we noted the number of claims and total word count of those
185

Our ability to distinguish between applicant- and examiner-cited prior art is limited in two
important respects. First, PatentsView only distinguishes between applicant- and examiner-cited
prior art patents or application; it does not distinguish between applicant- and examiner-cited
NPL. Second, PatentsView only includes this (partial) data for patents issued after 2000.
186
U.S. patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 are generally published 18
months after their filing date. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. Trademark Off., USPTO Will Begin Publishing
Patent Applications (Nov. 27, 2000), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-willbegin-publishing-patent-applications (noting that the publication mandate “stems from a
statutory mandate contained in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA)” and that
“[t]here are exclusions from the publication requirement, the most significant of which is for
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claims at the time of publication, and compared those figures to the total number
of claims and word count at the time of the application’s issuance as a granted
patent.187 Lastly, we identified whether each applicant sought patent protection
solely in the U.S. or, instead, prosecuted a “family” of similar applications in
various patent offices across the globe. For each patent with foreign family
members, we additionally noted the total number of its foreign counterparts, as
well as the specific patent office in which each was filed.
v.

Characteristics Acquired Post-Grant

Our final data collection efforts focused on characteristics acquired by each
patent since the time it was granted. First, we identified how many times each
patent had been cited during the prosecution of other, newer patents (i.e.,
“forward citations”).188 We also determined whether each patent had changed
hands post-issuance and, if so, how many times.189 Finally, we identified the
current owner of the patent—i.e., the respondent to each IPR—and classified
each owner as either an operating company, a “patent assertion entity” that
specializes in patent monetization, or some other form of “non-practicing entity”
that does not presently commercialize the patented technology.190
IV. BIVARIATE RESULTS
With this patent-level data collected, we next performed a bivariate
comparison of each metric across high- and low-quality patents to identify
promising candidates for further multivariate analysis (reported in Part V infra).
applicants who attest upon filing that they have not and will not file an application for the same
invention in a foreign country or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires
publication of applications 18 months after filing”).
187
Here we follow the lead of Alan C. Marco, et al., Patent Claims and Patent Scope (Working
Paper, Aug. 2016), available at https://issuu.com/hooverip2/docs/ip2-wp16001-paper.
188
See supra notes [25-30] and related text.
189
We obtained this information from AcclaimIP, which maintains a cleaned version of the
USPTO assignment database. See Number of Post-Grant Assignment Events,
http://help.acclaimip.com/m/acclaimip_help/l/181377-number-of-post-grant-assignment-events
-ana_anre_pexe_ct (last accessed Jan. 31, 2018). USPTO assignment records include many
entries that do not represent true transfers, including the recording of security interests and
corporate mergers or name changes. See, e.g., Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer
and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 691 (2010) (explaining that many recorded
assignments do not represent “transaction[s] of patents across firm boundaries” and instead result
from “administrative events, such as a name change, a security interest, a correction, and so on”
or “transactions between inventors-employers and their employees-assignees”).
190
We hand coded these classifications relying on publicly available data, including information
provided in documents filed in patent suits, entities’ websites, and other public information
regarding entities’ owners, parents, employees, and current and former products.
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As discussed above, we report two comparisons for each data point: one that
compares patents that were never instituted against those that were instituted at
least once, and a second comparison between patents that were not instituted at
least once and patents that were instituted every time they were challenged.191
A. Applicant, Prosecutor, and Examiner
Looking first at the characteristics of patents’ applicants, prosecutors, and
examiners, we find a number of statistically significant differences between
patents that were and were not successfully challenged in inter partes review. As
shown below in Table 2, we first note that patents originally obtained by small
entities are significantly less likely to pass muster in a PTAB institution
decision.192 To a lower 90 percent confidence level, the same is true of patents
originally obtained by individuals. Notably, both findings are consistent with
prior research suggesting that patentee sophistication and resources influence
patent validity.193
TABLE 2. APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS
N

Small Entity?

Individual?

Corporation?

191

754 / 2532

Yes

No

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

24% (182)
76% (572)

28% (489)
72% (1289)

0.085*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

30% (226)
70% (528)

35% (626)
65% (1152)

0.011**

Never Inst.
Instituted

23% (68)
77% (222)

27% (603)
73% (1639)

0.230

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

29% (85)
71% (205)

34% (767)
66% (1475)

0.099*

Never Inst.
Instituted

27% (573)
73%(1575)

26% (98)
74% (286)

0.661

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

34% (736)
66%(1412)

30% (116)
70%(268)

0.128

290 / 2532

2148 / 2532

For dichotomous variables, we report the results of Chi-square tests of the null that there is
no difference in the institution rate of patents with and without the characteristic. For continuous
variables, we report the results of t-tests comparing the mean number of the variable for patents
never instituted versus instituted and separately denied institution versus always instituted.
192
We do not analyze government-assigned patents because there were only five in our dataset.
See supra note [173].
193
For example, relatively to larger entities, small entities may tend to select lower quality patent
prosecution counsel, or similarly may not be able to spend as much on prosecution-related
services generally.
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Never Inst.
Instituted

31% (28)
69% (61)

26% (643)
74% (1800)

0.274

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

33% (29)
67% (60)

34% (823)
66% (1620)

0.909

89 / 2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on
the merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple
merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the
671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least
once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the 852 patents denied institution on
the merits in at least one petition to the 1,680 patents always instituted. Institution rates with
number of patents in parenthesis. Significant differences in institution rates designated:
* for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

Turning to choice of prosecution counsel, we also find significant results.
As shown below in Table 3, we find that patents prosecuted by large firms were
less likely to be instituted, while patents prosecuted by solo practitioners were
more likely to be instituted. While these correlations may have many drivers,194
we note that law firm size itself is positively correlated with hourly rates charged
for legal work and attorney salaries, both of which may suggest that large law
firms (on average) produce better legal work product and attract more highly
skilled attorneys than their smaller counterparts.
TABLE 3. PROSECUTING COUNSEL CHARACTERISTICS
N

Large Firm

Medium Firm

Small Firm

194

1017 / 2532

495 / 2532

Yes

No

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

31% (316)
69% (701)

23% (355)
77% (1160)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

38% (390)
62% (627)

30% (462)
70% (1053)

0.000***

Never Inst.
Instituted

24% (117)
76% (378)

27% (554)
73% (1483)

0.112

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

31% (152)
69% (343)

34% (700)
66% (1337)

0.124

Never Inst.
Instituted

24% (107)
76% (332)

27% (564)
73% (1529)

0.285

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

31% (138)
69% (301)

34% (714)
66% (1379)

0.292

439 / 2532

For example, while these correlations may suggest that large firms produce better legal work
product than smaller firms, they are also consistent with the hypothesis that inventors with
especially novel inventions are disproportionately likely to hire large firms as prosecution
counsel.
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218 / 2532

15/ 2532

PTAB and Patent Quality

44

Never Inst.
Instituted

20% (71)
80% (277)

27% (600)
73% (1584)

0.005***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

28% (96)
72% (252)

35% (756)
65% (1428)

0.010**

Never Inst.
Instituted

26% (57)
74% (161)

27% (614)
73% (1700)

0.936

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

33% (71)
67% (147)

34% (781)
66% (1533)

0.765

Never Inst.
Instituted

20% (3)
80% (12)

27% (668)
73% (1849)

0.772

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

33% (5)
67% (10)

34% (847)
66% (1670)

1.000

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the 671
petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once.
“Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the 852 patents denied institution on the merits
in at least one petition to the 1,680 patents always instituted. Institution rates with number of
patents in parenthesis. Significant differences in institution rates designated: * for p < .10; **for
p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

We again see significant results among patent examiner characteristics. In
fact, as shown below in Table 4, we find a significant correlation between
institution and every metric that we measured. First, and most intuitively, we
find a number of significant positive correlations between likelihood of
institution and the grant rates of individual examiners and art units. On average,
instituted patents were more likely to have been assigned to examiners with
higher overall allowance rates, to art units with higher overall allowance rates,
and to examiners who granted applications more often than their counterparts in
the same art unit.195
Less intuitively, we also find a significant positive correlation between
likelihood of institution and examiner experience. While at first blush one might
expect examiners to improve with experience, our finding is consistent with a
growing body of research indicating that the opposite appears to be true.196 Prior
195

The first two of these three findings may reflect to some extent that examiners assigned to art
unit covering more complex technology are given more time to examine patent applications. See
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note _, at 552. However, this fact cannot explain our finding that
institution is also correlated with the differential between an examiner’s grant rate and that of his
or her colleagues in the same art unit. It is also noteworthy that that this grant rate differential is
positive even for patents that were denied institution.
196
See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STATS. 817, 821 (2012) (finding that examiner “grant rate[s]
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studies have identified what we call a “promotion effect” and a “time allocation
effect” that may degrade average examiner performance over time. The
promotion effect captures two potential influences on examiner performance:
first, a tendency for relatively lenient examiners to work for the USPTO for
longer periods of time than their stricter counterparts,197 and second, a tendency
for more senior examiners with greater job security to be less diligent.198 The
time allocation effect additionally reflects the simple fact that more senior
examiners are expected to review more applications than their more junior
counterparts, and thus have less time per application to devote to the
examination.199 While we lack the data to pass judgment on the existence of
either effect, our findings nonetheless suggest quite consistently that experienced
examiners are suboptimally incentivized to produce high quality applications.200
increase[] monotonically with experience”); Mann, supra note _, at 2178 (finding “that
increasing experience relates to a decline in the quality of output” of USPTO examiners);
Cockburn, et al., supra note _, at 46-47 (finding, despite hypothesizing the opposite, that “if
anything, invalid patents are associated with examiners with higher mean levels of experience,
both in terms of volume and tenure”).
197
See Lemley & Sampat, supra, at 824 (“[T]he PTO faces significant employee attrition,
particularly among examiners who have been with the agency less than five years. If examiners
who were more diligent, more thorough, more technically sophisticated, or more highly educated
were more likely to leave the PTO earlier in their careers, perhaps because they have better job
opportunities, this could provide one explanation for our results”). Other possible causes include
that delivering good news is generally viewed as more enjoyable than delivering bad news and
that granting applications requires less effort than rejecting them, both of which may make the
job less stressful and more manageable for those who grant more often.
198
Most notably, “[e]xaminers at pay grades GS-13 and below must have their decisions
reviewed by an examiner who has ‘full signatory authority.’” Frakes & Wasserman, supra note
_, at 552. Frakes and Wasserman find that examiner “grant rate jumps distinctly once one enters
[GS-Level 14] (to a degree that is 8 percentage points higher than the reference period).” Id. at
556. See also Lemley & Sampat, supra, at 825 (“Another possibility is examiner tenure. After
promotion, examiners are not subject to the same level of scrutiny. Among other things, with
full signatory authority, they can sign off on their own applications without review. This could
plausibly cause them to be more lax.”); id. at 826 (finding that “more senior examiners
systematically cite less prior art[, which] reinforces the inference that senior examiners are doing
less work, rather than that they are merely getting it right more often than junior examiners”).
199
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note _, at 552.
200
To further investigate the relationship between examiner experience and allowance rates, we
ran a few additional multivariate regressions. While we found no significant correlation between
examiner experience and art unit allowance rates, we did find a significant correlation between
examiner experience and an examiner’s overall allowance rate. When we regressed the
probability of a patent’s institution on both examiner experience and examiner allowance rate,
we found a significant positive correlation with examiner allowance rate but not with examiner
experience. We discuss this finding further infra in Part V, but note for now that experienced
examiners tend to be more lenient while only some lenient examiners are more experienced.
Finally, and interestingly, when we regressed the probability of institution on both the art unit
allowance rate and the examiner’s allowance rate relative to the art unit, we found a significant
correlation to both. This finding suggests that petitioned patents from more lenient art units are
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TABLE 4. EXAMINER CHARACTERISTICS
N

No. of applications examiner

Examiner’s overall
allowance rate

Art Unit allowance rate

Allowance rate differential
(rel. to Art Unit)

2527

2527

2531

2527

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

1121 (670)
1248 (1857)

0.001***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

1150 (851)
1247 (1676)

0.005***

Never Inst.
Instituted

73% (670)
78% (1857)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

74% (851)
78% (1676)

0.000***

Never Inst.
Instituted

71% (671)
75% (1860)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

72% (852)
75% (1679)

0.000***

Never Inst.
Instituted

1.8% (670)
3.6% (1857)

0.002***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

2.3% (851)
3.5% (1676)

0.027**

NOTE.—Population of 2532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the merits
between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution
decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for the 2055 patents
instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition to the mean for the 1,680 patents
always instituted. Significant differences in means across institution categories designated: * for p <
.10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

B. Patent Characteristics
Turning next to the characteristics of challenged patents themselves, we
also find quite a few significant results. First, as shown below in Table 5, our
findings suggest that “older” patents tend to be of lower quality than those filed
and issued more recently. We find a significant positive correlation between
likelihood of institution and the amount of time that has passed since the filing
date of the earliest application to which the petitioned patent claims priority, the

of lower quality regardless of the leniency of the particular examiner they were assigned to, and
that patents assigned to more lenient examiners are of lower quality regardless of the leniency of
that examiner’s art unit.
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filing date of the application from the petitioned patent issued, and the date on
which the petitioned patent was issued.
While these correlations may have a number of explanations, it is hard to
overlook the fact that courts have made a number of substantive changes to U.S.
patent law in the last two decades, which (due to their retroactive application)
will naturally tend to reduce the quality of older patents that were examined in
light of older case law. In addition to case law that directly impacts the grounds
of invalidity that may be raised in IPR (such as the Supreme Court’s expansion
of obviousness in KSR v. Teleflex,201 or the Federal Circuit’s alterations to claim
construction rules in Phillips202), decisions impacting other conditions of
patentability may have an indirect influence as well. For example, it has long
been argued that patents vulnerable to patentable subject matter challenges are
disproportionately likely to also be vulnerable to anticipation and obviousness
challenges.203 Thus, the Supreme Court’s substantial tightening of the rules for
patentable subject matter in Bilski,204 Mayo,205 Myriad,206 and Alice207 may have
indirectly led in recent years to the abandonment of many applications (or
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
application of the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test as too “rigid”).
202
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (criticizing earlier
opinions that “placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and
encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources, in particular the specification and prosecution
history”).
203
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that in
crafting a test for abstractness there is “a risk of merely . . . seeing common attributes that track
the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that arise under other sections of the statute but
are not relevant to § 101” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Michael Risch,
Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008) (arguing that section 101 should be
abandoned altogether as a check on patentability); Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and
Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1087 (2007) (arguing that rejecting software
patents under section 101 is like “trying to kill an ant with an elephant gun” and is really a
“mere[] prox[y] for . . . other statutory patentability requirements”). But see Brian J. Love, Why
Patentable Subject Matter Matters for Software, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2010)
(criticizing “recent federal circuit opinions [that] dismissively reject section 101 challenges as
attacks that should have be made instead under sections 102, 103, and 112”).
204
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010) (rejecting the “machine-or-transformation test as
the sole test for what constitutes a [patentable] ‘process’”).
205
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-79 (2012) (holding
that the Patent Act’s prohibition on patenting a law of nature “cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment,” nor by
adding to the claim “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
scientists who work in the field”).
206
Assoc. Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590-94 (2013) (holding
that isolated DNA segments are not patentable subject matter).
207
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (holding that “the mere recitation
of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention”).
201
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shelving of many patents) that otherwise might have been of generally low
quality.
In addition, many in the patent community perceive a general increase in
the quality of USPTO examination in the past decade or so, particularly
following the 2009 confirmation of David Kappos as Director of the USPTO.208
During his tenure as Director of the USPTO, the size of the U.S. examining corps
grew by 30 percent and the agency’s backlog of unexamined applications began
to shrink for the first time in many years.209 While we are reluctant to ascribe
these findings to any particular cause or causes, our age-related results are
consistent with this hypothesis.

TABLE 5. PATENT AGE
N
Years earliest
priority to first
petition

Years filing to
first petition

2532

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

12.8 (671)
13.6 (1861)

0.001***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

13.1 (852)
13.5 (1680)

0.064*

Never Inst.
Instituted

9.0 (671)
9.4 (1861)

0.088*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

9.1 (852)
9.5 (1680)

0.078*

2532

See David J. Kappos, https://www.cravath.com/dkappos/ (last accessed Jan. 24, 2018) (“From
August 2009 to January 2013, Mr. Kappos served as Under Secretary of Commerce and Director
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) . . . . As Director of the USPTO, he
led the Agency in dramatically reengineering its entire management and operational systems as
well as its engagement with the global innovation community.”).
209
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, USPTO Director Kappos Will Leave in January 2013, Patently-O
(Nov. 26, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/11/uspto-director-kappos-will-leave-injanuary-2013.html (“In an effort to eliminate the patent prosecution backlog, Kappos has led the
charge to greatly increase the number of patent examiners over the past two years. During this
time, the number of examiners has swelled to over 8,000 – a more than 30% increase from two
years before.”); Joff Wild, David Kappos Will Leave a Much Better USPTO than He Found,
Intell. Asst Mgmt. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=1725fe9a50f2-4c7a-adef-6a8a12ececa4 (“[T]he real prize for the Director, and for the vast majority of
USPTO users as well as its wider community of stakeholders, has been improved quality.”);
Ryan Davis, Kappos a Tough Act to Follow as USPTO Director, Law.com (Nov. 27, 2012),
https://www.law360.com/articles/396625/kappos-a-tough-act-to-follow-as-uspto-director
(“[H]is tenure has drawn wide acclaim from attorneys, who said it may be difficult to find a
successor who can match his commitment to improving patent quality and open communication
with the patent community.”).
208
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Never Inst.
Instituted

5.8 (671)
6.4 (1861)

0.022**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

5.9 (852)
6.4 (1680)

0.017**

Never Inst.
Instituted

2008.7 (671)
2008.0 (1861)

0.004***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

2008.6 (852)
2008.0 (1680)

0.005***

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on
the merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value
for the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares
the mean value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one
petition to the mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means
across institution categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

We also find significant correlations between institution and various
metrics for the technology or technologies to which a patent relates. First, as
shown below in Table 6, we find a significant correlation between institution and
the number of U.S. technology classes assigned to petitioned patents.
Interestingly, our findings on this point contrast with those of Mann and
Underweiser. While they initially hypothesized (consistent with our findings)
that the number of technology classes would be negatively correlated with
validity—because an “invention spanning multiple classes would be a more
ambitious invention and thus more susceptible of invalidation because of the
multiplicity of technologies from which relevant art might be found”210—they
instead found a positive relationship, a fact that they chalked up to a large
number of classes signifying a thorough understanding of the technology by the
USPTO or the cutting-edge nature of the claimed invention. Consistent with
Mann and Underweiser’s original impulse, we suspect that our findings reflect
to some degree that the number of USPCs an application is assigned proxies the
technological breadth of the claimed invention, as well as the quantity of relevant
prior art that may anticipate it.
That said, we fail to find a significant correlation between institution and
CPC counts and, in fact, we find a significant correlation with respect to the
number of IPCs assigned to challenged patents that points in the opposite
direction. At first, both results struck us as odd because the USPTO maintains a
concordance between USPCs and both CPCs and IPCs.211 However, neither
210

Mann and Underweiser, supra note _, at 18.
The entire USPC-IPC concordance is available
https://figshare.com/articles/USPC-IPC_Correspondence/3502742.
211

for

download

here:
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concordance is a one-to-one match of classes. Indeed, some USPCs map to
fifteen or more IPCs, while others map to none. As discussed in greater detail
below, the negative correlation that we observe between institution and IPCs is
driven by the relatively small number of IPCs assigned to software patents. Thus,
we suspect that this correlation is principally an artefact of differing treatment
of software by the two classification systems, perhaps reflecting the fact that
“programs for computers” are not patentable in Europe.212
TABLE 6. PATENT TECHNOLOGY CLASSES
N

Num. Tech Classes
US

CPC

IPC

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

3.8
4.1

0.009***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

3.8
4.1

0.014**

Never Inst.
Instituted

9.7
9.9

0.639

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

9.8
9.8

0.928

Never Inst.
Instituted

4.8
4.4

0.056*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

4.8
4.3

0.013**

2532

2532

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value
for the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the
mean value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition
to the mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across
institution categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.
212

Article 52 of the European Patent Convention expressly excludes from the scope of patentable
subject matter “schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing
business, and programs for computers.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52,
Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. As applied by the European Patent Office and European courts,
this provision only prohibits patenting software-based inventions that are “solely” computer
algorithms and, thus, do not make a “technical” contribution to a non-excluded field. See, e.g.,
Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [75-76], [2007] 1 All E.R. 225
(A.C.) at ¶¶ 45-47 (Eng.) (holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the invention’s
“contribution [is] solely of excluded matter” or, in other words, “whether the contribution is
‘technical’”).
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As shown below in Table 7, we likewise found significant correlations
between institution and a patent’s classification as a “high tech,” “business
method,” “medical,” or “pharmaceutical” patent. While “high tech” patents
were significantly more likely to be instituted (and thus appear to be of lower
quality), the remaining categories were significantly less likely to be instituted
(and thus appear to be of higher quality).
With respect to patents covering medical and pharmaceutical technology,
our findings are consistent with conventional wisdom that such patents are of
relatively high quality. One reason why may be that pharmaceuticals are
typically covered by just a handful of patents each.213 In addition,
pharmaceutical patents are likely to have clearer bounds that most other
patents;214 indeed some claim specific molecules.215 Relatively speaking, both
facts tend to make it easier for applicants and examiners to locate and account
for relevant prior art. Low patent density also tends to increase the value of
individual pharmaceutical patents, which in turn may increase applicants’
incentives to obtain high quality patents. Whatever the precise cause, of all the
data points that we analyzed, a patent’s status as a pharmaceutical patent is one
of the most impressive; 42 percent of challenged pharmaceutical patents were
never instituted, compared to just 25 percent of all other patents.
Our findings with respect to “high tech” patents are, again, generally
consistent with long-espoused complaints about the quality of patents covering
computing and communications technology. In stark contrast to
pharmaceuticals, many consumer electronics are plausibly covered by thousands
of individual patents,216 many of which were obtained reflexively to serve as
small pieces of large defensive bulwarks rather than with assertion in mind.217
213

See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug?
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 299, 516-17 (2010) (reporting that pharmaceuticals are typically protected by just two to
four patents per drug).
214
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 107 (2008) (discussing “the
comparatively clear boundaries of chemical (including pharmaceutical) patents”); Mark A.
Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 905, 930
(“Unlike chemistry and biotechnology, where we have a clear scientific language for delineating
what a patent claim does and doesn’t cover, there is no standard language for software patents.”)
215
See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 4,681,893 (claiming atorvastatin calcium, the active ingredient in
Lipitor).
216
For example, defensive patent aggregator RPX once placed the number of patents covering
some aspect of a smartphone at approximately 250,000. RPX Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Form
S-1, 59 (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/
000119312511240287/ds1.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
217
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System,,62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 308-09 (2010)
(defining “defensive patenting” as “the filing of patents in order to gain freedom to operate, for
the specific purposes of maintaining patent peace, obtaining access to the technology of others,
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In addition, there is good reason to believe that the USPTO may be ill equipped
to locate important prior art to cutting-edge computing technology.218
That said, the subset of high tech patents that cover software and business
methods stand out in our results as exceptions to the conventional wisdom. No
other category of patent has been criticized more heavily in recent years than
these two.219 Yet, we fail to find a significantly correlation between institution
and software coverage, and more surprisingly still, find a significant negative
correlation between institution and business method coverage. Thirty-eight
percent of business method patents in our study were never instituted, close to
the same rate that we observe for pharmaceutical patents.
We are reluctant, however, to interpret these results as indicating that
business method patents are of high quality generally. Instead, we suspect that
our findings reflect selection effects caused by the availability of CBM review,
in which petitioners can argue that a patent fails to meet the standards of section
101 and 112, in addition to 102 and 103. We hypothesize that parties seeking to
challenge the validity of business method patents generally prefer to do so in a
venue where they can argue that the patent falls outside the scope of patentable
subject matter or fails to meet the requirements of section 112 due to
unwarranted use of broad “functional” claim language.220 If so, business method
patents challenged in inter partes review will be, relative to the broader
and neutralizing patent lawsuits” and noting that “[l]arge portfolios have spawned the
development of other large portfolios”).
218
See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2001) (noting that while “[t]he patent system presumes a finite,
comprehensively indexed technical literature and relies on individual examiners to . . . search
the relevant subliteratures” it is often the case that “software innovations . . . may be documented
only via developer specifications or online FAQs [, and f]requently, the source code itself is
never released at all.”); Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy,
7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 279 (2001) (“Commercial business models of the
type that are being applied to the Internet, are likely, if anything, to be less well documented than
financial methods. There simply is no real scientific literature on business models.”).
219
See, e.g., Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, supra, at 928
(“Software patents are widely acknowledged as creating a large number of problems for the
patent system”). In fact, many commentators have argued in favor of eliminating patent
protection for software. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025, 1135-36 (1990).
220
See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F. 3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(holding that a claim “recite[ing] function without reciting sufficient structure for performing
that function” should be interpreted as a means-plus-function claim under section 112(f) and,
thus, is invalid as indefinite under section 112(b) if the patent’s specification fails to “disclose[]
sufficient structure that corresponds to the claimed function”). See also Shong Yin, Williamson
v. Citrix Online: A Fundamental Shift and Return to Form in Means-Plus-Function
Interpretation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 687, 707 (2016) (“The impact of the Williamson II
decision has been expedient and immediate across the PTO and district courts. Over twenty
PTAB decisions and over twenty district court decisions have cited it.”).
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population of business method patents, disproportionately less likely to be
susceptible to challenges under sections 101 and 112 and, thus, more likely to
have narrow claims that are limited to narrow applications in particular fields.
Such claims, it seems safe to assume, would also be less susceptible to challenges
on anticipation or obviousness grounds.221
TABLE 7. PATENT TECHNOLOGY AREAS
N

High Tech

Medical

Pharma

Software

Business Meth.

1367/
2532

423/
2532

199 /
2532

599 /
2532

181/
2532

Yes

No

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

23%(321)
77%(1046)

30% (350)
70% (815)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

32% (437)
68%(930)

36% (415)
64% (750)

0.006***

Never Inst.
Instituted

36% (151)
64% (272)

25% (520)
75% (1589)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

42% (178)
58% (245)

32% (674)
68% (1435)

0.000***

Never Inst.
Instituted

42% (84)
58% (115)

25% (587)
75% (1746)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

49% (98)
51% (101)

32% (754)
68% (1579)

0.000***

Never Inst.
Instituted

26% (158)
74% (441)

27% (513)
73% (1420)

0.958

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

35% (208)
65% (391)

33% (644)
67% (1289)

0.521

Never Inst.
Instituted

38% (69)
62% (112)

26% (602)
74% (1749)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

48% (87)
52% (94)

33% (765)
67% (1586)

0.000***

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on
the merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple
merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the
671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least
once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the 852 patents denied institution on
221

See supra note _ (collecting sources linking patent ineligibility to anticipation and
obviousness).
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the merits in at least one petition to the 1,680 patents always instituted. Institution rates with
number of patents in parenthesis. Significant differences in institution rates designated: *
for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

As shown below in Tables 8 and 9, we additionally find significant
correlations between a patent’s likelihood of institution and metrics of its length
and complexity. While we fail to find a significant relationship between claim
count and institution,222 we do nonetheless find significant results with respect
to the word count of various parts of a patent.
Looking first at the length of a challenged patent’s specification, we find a
significant relationship between institution and both absolute and relative length
measurements. Though one might expect patent length to serve as a proxy for
the patentee’s sophistication and resources, our findings are a bit more nuanced.
Specifically, we find that that, while patent length per claim is negatively
correlated with institution, absolute patent length is positively correlated with
institution. That is, we find that never-instituted patents have fewer total words,
shorter abstracts, and shorter specifications, but nonetheless also more words per
claim than instituted patents. While, again, there may be various factors at play
here, we suspect that these results reflect two effects. First, long patents with a
large number of claims may tend to cover so much ground that they overwhelm
examiners and prosecutors. Second, patents with specifications that are long
relative to their claim count may tend to better disclose the patented technology,
including relevant prior art. If so, such disclosure may assist examiners or reflect
greater pre-filing diligence on the part of their applicants or prosecutors
TABLE 8. PATENT LENGTH
N

Total No. Claims

No. Independent Claims

222

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

28.0
30.1

0.101

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

29.1
29.8

0.543

Never Inst.
Instituted

3.9
4.0

0.319

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

3.9
4.0

0.607

2532

2532

This finding itself may be noteworthy simply because it seems logical to assume that the more
claims a patent has, the more opportunities there are for the applicant or examiner to make a
mistake. See Mann & Underweiser, supra note _, at 19 (“It is easy to suggest hypotheses that
would relate the number of claims or complexity of the patent to validity. For example, a patent
with more claims necessarily has more places in which mistakes could have been made.”).
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Never Inst.
Instituted

14678
16040

0.053*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

15154
15945

0.275

Never Inst.
Instituted

1033
820

0.034**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

963
833

0.122

Never Inst.
Instituted

112
118

0.006***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

114
117

0.126

Never Inst.
Instituted

12756
13969

0.071*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

13109
13920

0.238

Never Inst.
Instituted

5909
5121

0.055*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

5731
5126

0.103

2532

2532

2536

2532

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for
the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the
mean value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition
to the mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across
institution categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

Turning to the length of challenged patents’ claims, we fail to find a
significant correlation between institution and the overall length of a patent’s
claim set. That said, as shown below in Table 9, we do find significance for both
measures of the length of claim 1. As conventional wisdom has long
suggested,223 we find that instituted patents have significantly shorter individual
claims, while patents that avoided institution have significantly longer claims.

223

As discussed supra, note _.
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TABLE 9. CLAIM LENGTH
N

Total Word Count of
All Claims

Claim 1 Word Count

Claim 1 Unique Word
Count

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

1473
1536

0.440

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

1546
1506

0.619

Never Inst.
Instituted

169
158

0.074*

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

171
156

0.005***

Never Inst.
Instituted

60.5
57.5

0.003***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

60.7
57.1

0.000***

2532

2532

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for
the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the
mean value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition
to the mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across
institution categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

C. Examination Intensity
Moving next to data that proxies the scrutiny each application received
from the USPTO, we again find a number of significant correlations with
institution. First, as shown below in Table 10, we find a significant correlation
between institution and various categories of “reverse citations.” While one
might expect institution to be negatively correlated with counts of such
citations—e.g., on the theory that more diligent applicants and examiners will
tend to find and review more prior art224—we actually find the opposite. We
observe that never-instituted patents cited fewer pieces of prior art overall, had
fewer prior art citations added by the examiner, and cited to fewer pieces of nonpatent prior.

224

See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497,
1538 (2003) (hypothesizing that “patents that include more citations or more diverse citations
are more likely to be valid”).
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Though surprising at first blush, these results are nonetheless consistent
with findings by other researchers. In prior studies of patents examined by the
EPO or challenged in EPO opposition procedures both Lei and Wright225 and
Harhoff and Reitzig226 found a negative correlation between prior art citations
and patent quality. Accordingly, we suspect that these correlations tell us little
about applicant and examiner diligence, and instead reflect to a much greater
degree the density and proximity of prior art to the patented invention. In other
words, a large number of reverse citations may simply reflect that the applicant
and examiner correctly determined that the claimed invention was similar to a
large number of pre-existing disclosures (some of which they may have
inadvertently missed), while a small number of reverse citations may similarly
reflect that the applicant and examiner correctly concluded that the claimed
invention is relatively unique and thus less likely to be anticipated or obvious.
TABLE 10. REVERSE CITATIONS
N

Total No. Reverse
Citations

Added by Examiner

Num. Reverse Citations
to Foreign Patent
Materials

225

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

114
142

0.007***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

127
138

0.317

Never Inst.
Instituted

6.1
7.1

0.013**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

6.2
7.1

0.012**

12.4
12.0

0.737

12.4
12.0

0.733

2532

227

2161

2532

Never Inst.
Instituted
Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

Zhen Lei & Brian D. Wright, Why Weak Patents?Rational Ignorance or Pro-“Customer”
Tilt?, Unpublished Manuscript, at *38, http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Lei_Wright_Why
_Weak_Patents.pdf (“[F]or the US patents in our sample, a higher number of cited prior patents
is positively correlated with the failure at the EPO. Higher citations of prior art tend to indicate
the weakness of a patent, rather than survival of a more rigorous examination, partly because
issuing a US patent itself does not tell us much about its strength, as the applicant can always
persist until the US examiner concedes.”).
226
Harhoff & Reitzig, supra note _ at 470 (finding “that there is also a significant relationship
between backward citations and the incidence of opposition”).
227
As discussed supra in note _, added-by-examiner designations are unavailable in the
USPTO’s databases for patents issued prior to 2001.

[Draft v. 2/7/2018]

Added by Examiner

Num. Reverse Citations
to Non-Patent Lit.228

PTAB and Patent Quality

58

Never Inst.
Instituted

0.14
0.18

0.160

Denied Inst.
Always Inst

0.15
0.18

0.374

Never Inst.
Instituted

34.5
52.1

0.002***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

44.0
49.2

0.438

2211

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution
decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for the 2055 patents
instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition to the mean for the 1,680
patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across institution categories designated:
* for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

With respect to specific examination events, we find just a few relatively
weak correlations. First, as shown below in Table 11, we fail to find a significant
correlation between institution and the duration of the examination process.
Despite the intuition that longer examination may correlate with more rigorous
examination and thus higher quality patents, our data suggests the lack of a clear
relationship between the two. To the contrary, as our findings with respect to
reverse citations also attest, it may be the case that more unique inventions have
less prior art and thus face a speedier path to issuance.
That said, we do find a modestly significant negative correlation between
institution and both the number of times an application was rejected and the
number of times the applicant filed an information disclosure statement. More
rejections may correlate with more rigorous examination, or conversely may
indicate that the patent’s claims are very close to the prior art. Similarly, more
frequent disclosure of prior art by an applicant may correlate with applicant
diligence, or conversely may indicate that the applicant is seeking patent
protection in a field crowded with prior art. All in all, our findings suggest that
reverse citations and the frequency of examination events are, at best, noisy
proxies for quality.
Following Marco et al., we additionally examined the change in total
number of claims and word count of claim 1 from the time that each patent’s
application was publication to the time the application issued.229 Our results here
228
229

Added-by-examiner designations are also unavailable for all reverse citations to NPL. Id.
Marco, et al., supra note _.
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are a mixed bag as well. While we do observe a larger decrease in the number
of claims from publication to grant among non-instituted patents, we do not find
a significant correlation between institution and the change in word count of
claim 1.
TABLE 11. PROSECUTION EVENTS, EFFECT ON CLAIM COUNT/LENGTH
N

Num. Final Rejections

Num. IDS Filed

Change in # of Claim 1
Words

Change in # of Claims

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

0.57
0.51

0.104

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

0.57
0.50

0.067*

Never Inst.
Instituted

3.5
3.2

0.260

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

3.5
3.2

0.073*

Never Inst.
Instituted

35.0
23.2

0.269

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

32.3
23.3

0.372

Never Inst.
Instituted

-0.65
-0.03

0.016**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

-0.51
-0.03

0.051*

2532

2532

1619

1619

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean value
of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for the
2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition to the
mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across institution
categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

Turning next to data on patent families, we did not find a significant
correlation between institution and the size of a patent’s U.S. family. As shown
below in Table 12, we did however find a significant negative correlation
between institution and the number of foreign applications in a patent’s family.
In addition to capturing an applicant’s confidence in the uniqueness and value
of its invention, this finding may also indicate that patent quality in enhanced
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when an invention is examined by multiple patent examiners employed by
multiple patent offices. Prior and concurrent examinations may turn up
additional prior art, limit applicants’ ability to interpret claim language in certain
ways,230and (at the very least) suggest that the invention is one viewed by its
applicant as worth the cost of pursuing a bulwark of patent protection.
TABLE 12. PATENT FAMILY
N

Num. US Parent Apps

Num. US Child Apps

Num. Foreign Family
Members

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

2.14
2.28

0.264

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

2.21
2.26

0.690

Never Inst.
Instituted

2.46
2.38

0.751

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

2.46
2.37

0.682

Never Inst.
Instituted

3.52
2.97

0.020**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

3.52
2.91

0.004***

2532

2532

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean value
of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for the 2055
patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the mean value of
a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition to the mean for
the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across institution categories
designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

That said, despite observing a significant effect associated with foreign
examination generally, we failed to detect a clear, significant link between U.S.
patent quality and concurrent examination by any of the world’s next four most

230

See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 856, 869 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (holding that patent-in-suit is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct stemming from
failure to disclose to the USPTO briefs that were filed with the EPO during prosecution of a
related application).
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popular patent offices.231 Though it is often said that at least the EPO provides
more thorough examination than the USPTO,232 we find little evidence that
additional scrutiny from any particular foreign patent office improves U.S.
patent quality.
TABLE 13. INTERNATIONAL PATENT FAMILY
Yes

No

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

27% (234)
73% (634)

26% (321)
74% (911)

0.651

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

36% (310)
64% (558)

33% (406)
67% (826)

0.191

Never Inst.
Instituted

28% (180)
72% (465)

26% (375)
74% (1080)

0.309

Denied Inst.
Always Inst

36% (230)
64% (415)

33% (486)
67% (969)

0.319

Never Inst.
Instituted

29% (84)
71% (202)

26% (471)
74% (1343)

0.221

Denied Inst.
Always Inst

40% (115)
60% (171)

33% (601)
67% (1213)

0.022**

Never Inst.
Instituted

28% (120)
72% (314)

26% (435)
74% (1231)

0.541

Denied Inst.
Always Inst

35% (152)
65% (282)

34% (564)
66% (1102)

0.650

N

EPO Family Member

JPO Family Member

KIPO Family Member

SIPO Family Member

868/
2100

645/
2100

286/
2100

434/
2100

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the 671
petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied
Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least
one petition to the 1,680 patents always instituted. Institution rates with number of patents in
parenthesis. Significant differences in institution rates designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05;
and *** for p < .01.

231

See World Intell. Prop. Org., IP Facts and Figures, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/charts/
ipfactsandfigures2016.html (“JUST FIVE IP OFFICES ACCOUNT FOR MORE THAN
FOUR-FIFTHS OF ALL PATENT FILINGS”).
232
See Chien, supra note _, at *15 (“Industry surveys conducted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 20152016 have each consistently found the EPO to have the highest ratings among the five leading
Patent Offices around the world”).
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D. Post-Grant Characteristics
The final group of bivariate comparisons that we report explore
correlations with characteristics that challenged patents acquired after they were
granted. Though well removed from the actual prosecution of challenged
patents, these data points may nonetheless reveal how other patent-system
participants assessed the patent’s quality at various times post-issuance.
First, we consider “forward citations,” i.e., citations to the challenged
patent that appear on the face of subsequent patents. As shown below in Table
14, we do not find a significant correlation between forward citations and
institution. This result is noteworthy because forward citations are generally
considered the single most important proxy for patent value—generally under
the theory that such citations indicate “that an innovation has contributed to the
development of subsequent invention.”233 Consistent with this theory, one might
expect petitioned patents with more forward citations to pre-date more of the art
in a particular field and, thus, possess claims that are more likely to be novel and
non-obvious. We find no evidence supporting this hypothesis, however.
TABLE 14. FORWARD CITATIONS
N

Num. Forward Citations

Mean:

p

Never Inst.
Instituted

48.8
51.4

0.584

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

51.0
50.6

0.933

2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution
decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for the 2055 patents
instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the mean value of a trait for
the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition to the mean for the 1,680
patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across institution categories designated:
* for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

Turning next to each patent’s ownership history, we do find a number of
significant results. As shown below in Tables 15 and 16, we find that instituted
patents were more likely to have changed hands and more likely to have changed
hands frequently. Also, as shown below in Table 17, we find significant positive
correlations between a patent’s institution and its ownership by an NPE or
PAE—a finding that may reflect a tendency for NPEs and PAEs to choose
233

Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 137 (2001).
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patents with broad claims that are more likely to cover both popular products
and the prior art. While reassignment might plausibly serve as a proxy for a
number of things, we suspect that it most likely reflects whether or not
challenged patents were sold on the secondary market for monetization
purposes.234 We explore this relationship further below.
TABLE 15. REASSIGNMENT HISTORY
N

Reassigned?

1417 /
2532

Yes

No

p

25% (348)
75% (1069)

29% (323)
71% (792)

0.014**

32% (458)
68% (959)

30% (394)
70% (721)

0.117

Never Inst.
Instituted

23% (112)
77% (385)

27% (559)
73% (1476)

0.027**

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.
.

31% (154)
69% (343)

34% (698)
66% (1337)

0.169

Never Inst.
Instituted
Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

3+ Reassignments?

497 /
2532

TABLE 16. REASSIGNMENT COUNT

Reassignment
Count

Never Inst.
Instituted

Mean:
1.2
1.4

0.003***

1.3
1.4

0.191

2532
Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the
merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the mean
value of a trait for the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the mean value for
the 2055 patents instituted at least once. “Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the
mean value of a trait for the 852 patents denied institution on the merits in at least one petition
to the mean for the 1,680 patents always instituted. Significant differences in means across
institution categories designated: * for p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

234

To explore the relationship between reassignments and NPE-ownership, we regressed the
probability that a petitioned patent was never instituted on three variables: NPE-ownership and
both reassignment measures. In that three-variable regression, NPE- and PAE-ownership
remained highly significant, while reassignment lost significance—a finding that strongly
suggests that our reassignment-related correlations are driven by ownership-type.
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TABLE 17. CURRENT OWNER TYPE
N

Individual

57 /
2532

Yes

No

p

42% (24)
58% (33)

26% (647)
74% (1828)

0.010**

46% (26)
54% (31)

33% (826)
67% (1649)

0.065*

Never Inst.
Instituted

22% (224)
78% (810)

30% (447)
70% (1051)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

31% (316)
69% (718)

36% (536)
64% (962)

0.007***

Never Inst.
Instituted

19% (149)
81% (639)

30% (522)
70% (1222)

0.000***

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

29% (228)
71% (560)

36% (624)
64% (1120)

0.001***

Never Inst.
Instituted

34% (26)
66% (51)

26% (645)
74% (1810)

0.150

Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

35% (27)
65% (50)

34% (825)
66% (1630)

0.807

Never Inst.
Instituted
Denied Inst.
Always Inst.

NPE

PAE

University

1034/
2532

788 /
2532

77 /
2532

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on
the merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit
institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus “Instituted” compares the 671
petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once.
“Denied Inst.” versus “Always Inst.” compares the 852 patents denied institution on the
merits in at least one petition to the 1,680 patents always instituted. Institution rates with
number of patents in parenthesis. Significant differences in institution rates designated: * for
p < .10; **for p < .05; and *** for p < .01.

Finally, we note the potential importance of the timing of each patent’s
challenge. To gauge whether PTAB panels have become more or less strict over
time, we grouped all challenged patents by the date of their first institution
decision on the merits and calculated quarterly “first-time institution rates.” As
shown below in Figure 2, we observe a rather large, significant drop in that rate
over time.235 While such a drop does not necessarily indicate a change in PTAB
institution standards—for example, petitioners may have initially challenged
especially weak patents—our multivariate results (discussed below) show that

235

We find a significant nine-month gap (p = 0.000) between the mean quarter of first institution
decision among instituted patents and the mean quarter of first institution decision among never
instituted patents.
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this decline persists even when controlling for the other significant data points
we study.236
FIGURE 2. FIRST-TIME INSTITUTION RATE BY QUARTER
100%
90%

97%
89% 88%
86% 89%
80% 78%

80%
70%

73%

78%

78%

76%
69% 70%

65%

69% 71%
55%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

NOTE—Quarterly rate of institution on the merits for all patents previously not subject to an institution
decision on the merits. Dotted linear trend line included.

V.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

While the bivariate results reported above are interesting in their own right,
many of the patent traits studied are plausibly intercorrelated. To shed more light
on the driving forces behind our results, we ran three series of probit regressions
to determine which of the promising predictors identified supra survive
multivariate analysis.237 First, we examine a single regression of twenty-one of
the most promising variables across our population of patents.238 Next, we
analyze a series of similar regressions that additionally compare combinations
of the four examiner characteristics. Finally, we describe a series of regressions
across subsets of petitioned patents. In this third regression, we also test whether
additional variables that did not appear significant supra might nonetheless show
significance in smaller subsets of challenged patents.

236

Later in our multivariate analysis, we find that the quarterly trend is a significant predictor of
institution with the addition of one quarter predicting a 0.7 percent decrease in the chance of
institution. Accordingly, the IPR institution rate appears to have declined over time even
controlling for the various patent characteristics we study.
237
We report the marginal effects for each independent variable using Stata’s dprobit command.
238
With the exception of five patents for which we lack examiner-related data.
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A. Twenty-One Variables, Across All Patents
For the first of our multivariate regressions, we selected a set of twentyone variables for further analysis. We selected these with two considerations in
mind: first, their significance in the bivariate regressions reported above, and
second, their representativeness of the various categories of data that we
collected.239 The variables that we selected are listed below in the first column
of Table 18, which also presents the results of a probit regression of all twentyone variables across 2,527 challenged patents. While each variable was
significantly correlated with institution in the bivariate analysis described above,
we find that many lose their significance when we control for the other twenty.
That said, many others retain their significance and, thus, stand out to use as
strong predictors of patent quality.
Beginning with applicant characteristics, we find that while small entity
status remains significant, initial assignment of the petitioned patent to an
individual is no longer a significant predictor of institution. Controlling for the
other twenty variables included in Table 18, petitioned small entity patents
remain about five percent more likely to be instituted at least once. With respect
to the applicant’s choice of prosecution counsel, we see that petitioned patents
prosecuted by large firms remain significantly more likely to avoid institution—
about six percent more likely to be specific. That said, controlling for all twenty
other variables, prosecution by a solo practitioner loses its significance, likely
due to its correlation with small entity status.240 Turning next to the
characteristics of petitioned patents’ examiners, we find significance with
respect to the allowance rate of examiners’ art units and the differential between
examiners’ allowance rate and that of the art unit (though the latter is significant
only at a 90 percent confidence level). We investigate the relationship between
institution and examiner-related variables in greater detailed infra.
Moving on to characteristics of the petitioned patents themselves, we first
make the noteworthy finding that neither of the two patent age-related
variables—time from priority to first petition and grant year—remains
significant. Despite the high negative correlation between these two age
characteristics, including both in our regressions is not the source of lost
significance. Rather, additional correlation tests we conducted revealed that both
variables are highly correlated with other, stronger predictors of institution,

239

We also avoided including highly correlated or collinear variables from the same group in the
same regression.
240
In an unreported regression that omits the large firm variable from Table 18, we find that
prosecution by a solo practitioner is also a significant predictor of institution, with soloprosecuted patents 5 percent more likely to be instituted than other patents (p = 0.049). Thus,
prosecutor size appears to be a robust proxy for patent quality.
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including examiner characteristics, reverse citations, technology type, and PAE
ownership.
Interestingly, we also fail to find significant relationships between
institution and “high tech” or “pharmaceutical” subject matter.241 As revealed
below in Table 19, pharmaceutical coverage is strongly and negatively
correlated with examiner allowance rate and art unit allowance rate.242 High tech
subject matter is also strongly correlated with several other variables, including
examiner experience, examiner allowance rate, patent age, and PAE
ownership.243
While our technology classification variables lose most of their
explanatory power in our multivariate regressions, the number of USPCs
assigned to a patent by the USPTO remains statistically significant. As shown
below in Table 18, the marginal effect of one additional USPC is a 0.6 percent
increase in the chance of institution.244 We likewise continue to see a significant
relationship between institution and both length-related variables that we
included. The number of unique words in claim 1, in particular, appears to be a
robust proxy for quality, with a marginal effect of 10 additional words reducing
the risk of institution by one percent. For word count per claim, our regression
reveals a far more modest marginal effect: a decrease of 1,000 words per claim
leads to just a one percent increase in the probability of institution.245
Moving to prosecution-related variables, we continue to see modest
effects. First, while the total number of reverse citations remains a significant
positive predictor of institution, the magnitude of the effect is small, with an
In similar unreported regressions, we substituted “medical” subject matter for
“pharmaceutical” subject matter, and separately substituted “software” subject matter for “high
tech” subject matter. Neither swap reversed the lack of significance we report here.
242
The mean allowance rate among examiners of challenged pharmaceutical patents was 55
percent, while the mean allowance rate among examiners of all other challenged patents was 79
percent (p = 0.000). Similarly, the mean allowance rate among art units to which challenged
pharmaceutical patents were assigned was 57 percent, while the mean allowance rate among all
other art units to which challenged patents were assigned is 75 percent (p = 0.000).
243
Almost all PAE patents are high tech patents, and as we have already discussed, PAE patents
are significantly more likely to be instituted. Moreover, the mean allowance rate among
examiners of challenged high tech patents was 82 percent, while the mean allowance rate among
examiners of all other challenged patents was 71 percent (p = 0.000).
244
In an unreported set of specifications in which we substituted IPC count for USPC count, IPC
count was not a significant predictor of institution (p = 0.125).
245
In an unreported set of specifications, we found that specification-word-count-perindependent-claim also has a statistically significant, negative relationship with institution. For
example, when we substituted specification-word-count-per-independent-claim for total-wordcount-per-claim in specification 3 of Table 19, we found that a decrease of 1,000 words per
independent claim in the specification is associated with a 0.27 percent increase in the probability
of institution (p = 0.010). In unreported specifications, we also tested the three “absolute” length
variables mentioned above—total word count, total specification word count, and total abstract
word count. None of these was a significant predictor of institution, however.
241
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additional 100 citations associated with just a 1.5 percent increase in the
probability of institution. 246 We likewise find weak evidence that the number of
IDS filings in a patent’s prosecution history is a useful predictor of institution.
While the marginal effect is a 0.36 percent decrease in the chance of institution
per additional IDS filing, it just misses significance at the 90 percent confidence
level (p = 0.104).247 Finally, controlling for all twenty other variables, we fail to
find significance in any variable related to family size.
We do find, however, a number of significant associations between
institution and attributes acquired post grant that survive all twenty controls.
First, we continue to see (with our “Quarter First Institution Decision” variable)
that patents subject to institution decisions more recently are less likely to have
been instituted, which suggests either that the PTAB has become easier on
petitioned patents over time or that we have failed to capture in our variables one
or more significant metrics that has varied over time. We also continue to see
statistically significant results for patents owned by PAEs. Even after controlling
for all of the other quality-related characteristics listed in Table 18, PAE patents
remain nearly 8 percent more likely than all other patents to have been
instituted.248

246

In unreported regressions, we also found that reverse citations to NPL was a positive
statistically significant predictor of institution. In fact, the magnitude of this variable’s impact
(in an alternative version of Table 19 specification 3) was about twice that of total reverse
citations, with an additional 100 citations to NPL leading to a more than 3 percent increase in
the probability of institution (i.e., a coefficient of -0.00033 with p = 0.001). In yet other
unreported regressions similar to those in Table 19, we also found that the variable “reverse
citations added by the examiner” is also a positive, but not statistically significant, predictor of
institution. In an alternative version of Table 19 specification 3, the marginal effect for “reverse
citations added by the examiner” was -0.0018 (p = 0.085).
247
In an unreported regression, we substituted the number of final rejections for the number of
IDS filings and found rejection count to be entirely insignificant (p > 0.600).
248
In unreported regressions, we found that NPE ownership is likewise a statistically significant
predictor of institution. Of the two, PAE ownership is the stronger predictor. Substituting NPE
for PAE in Table 18 yields a coefficient of -0.051 (p = 0.016). As discussed above, PAE
ownership is also highly correlated with all three of our reassignment history variables shown in
Tables 15 and 16. We tested this relationship in three unreported regressions that each added a
reassignment-related variable to Table 18. In each of these regressions, PAE ownership remained
significant, while each reassignment variable lost its significance. Accordingly, our reassignment
history variables appear to lack significance independent of PAE ownership.
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TABLE 18. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LIKELIHOOD
PETITIONED PATENT NEVER INSTITUTED
Applicant, Prosecutor, and Examiner Characteristics:
Small Entity
Individual Assignee

-0.050** (0.020)
-0.011 (0.032)

Large Firm Prosecutor

0.063*** (0.019)

Solo Firm Prosecutor

-0.023 (0.027)

No. of applications examiner reviewed
Art Unit allowance rate
Allowance rate differential (rel. to Art Unit)

-0.000018 (0.000013)
-0.299*** (0.096)
-0.145* (0.082)

Patent Characteristics:
Quarter First Institution Decision

0.0078*** (0.0023)

Years earliest priority to first petition

-0.0028 (0.0025)

Grant year

-0.0037 (0.0028)

Num. of US Classes

-0.0063** (0.0031)

High Tech

0.010 (0.021)

Pharma

0.062 (0.042)

Word Count / Claim

11e-6** (5e-6)

Unique Word Count of Claim 1

0.0013*** (0.0004)

Examination Intensity
Num. Reverse Citations

-0.00015*** (0.00004)

Num. IDS Filed

0.0036 (0.0022)

Num. Foreign Family Members

-0.0013 (0.0020)

Post Grant Characteristics
Reassigned?
Individual Owned
PAE Owned

-0.008 (0.019)
0.172** (0.074)
-0.076*** (0.021)
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Log-likelihood

-1390

Observations

2527

NOTE.—Population of 2532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution
decision on the merits between 9/16/2012 and 1/31/2017. Some patents were the
subject of multiple merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus
“Instituted” compares the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to
the 2055 patents instituted at least once. Marginal effects reported with discrete
change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors included in
parenthesis. * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.

B. Examiner Characteristics
Among the variables that remain significant in the multivariate regression
described above, characteristics of the petitioned patent’s examiner stand out to
us as perhaps the most intriguing, as well as the most highly correlated—and in
the case of allowance rates clearly collinear. To investigate these variables
further, we conducted a series of multivariate regressions, five of which are
shown below in Table 19, to compare various combinations of four variables
related to petitioned patents’ examiners: the total number of applications they
have examined, their allowance rate, their art unit’s allowance rate, and the
differential between these latter two rates.249 Of these four variables, our results
strongly suggest that examiner allowance rate is the most important.
First, we began by comparing the marginal effects of examiner allowance
rate and art unit allowance rate.250 Though we saw above that both have a
significant positive correlation with institution, the two variables are clearly
correlated to some extent because art units with higher overall allowance rates
will naturally tend to be staffed with many examiners that have relatively high
individual allowances rates. Before comparing the two variables together in a
single regression, we first measured the marginal effect of each variable in a
nineteen-variable regression that omits the other.251 The regression that included
only examiner allowance rate returned a coefficient of -0.248 (p = 0.000),
indicating that a ten percent increase in an examiner’s allowance rate leads to a
2.5 percent decline in a probability that a patent examined by that individual will
never be instituted. The regressions that included only art unit allowance rate
returned a coefficient of -0.260 (p = 0.002), indicating quite similarly that a ten
249

In Table 18 supra, we included allowance rate differential and art unit allowance rate, but
omitted examiner allowance rate because the latter is simply the sum of the first two variables.
In other words, each of the three variables is perfectly collinear with the other two in
combination.
250
That is, we ran two 20-variable regressions that included only one of our examiner
characteristics at a time. These two regressions are not shown below in Table 19, but are
otherwise identical to those shown below in Table 19.
251
These two regressions are not shown in Table 19.
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percent increase in an art unit’s allowance rate is associated with a 2.6 percent
drop in the probability that petitioned patent from that unit will never be
instituted. Thus, our findings suggest that decreases in either examiner allowance
rates or art unit allowance rates will improve patent quality.252 When we include
both variables together in a single regression, as shown below in Specification
1, the results suggest that examiner allowance rate is the stronger of the two,
with a coefficient of -0.193 (p = 0.009) compared to a coefficient of -0.149 (p =
0.111) for art unit allowance rate. These results suggest that, when controlling
for art unit allowance rate, examiner allowance rate continues to have a
significant impact (but not vice versa).253
Looking next at examiner experience, we see from Specifications 2, 4, and
5 that the number of applications an examiner has handled in his or her career is
a statistically significant predictor of institution, both by itself and when
additionally controlling for art unit allowance rate or the differential between
examiner and art unit allowance rates. The marginal effect of experience is large
as well, with each 1,000 additional applications assigned to an examiner leading
to a 2.5 percent increase in the probability this his or her patents will be
instituted.254 However, comparing specifications 2 and 3, it appears that much
of the significance of examiner experience is driven by examiner allowance rate
and not the other way around. Shifting from specification 2 to specification 3,
we find that examiner experience is not significant when controlling for
examiner allowance rate (p = 0.167 in specification 3). Thus, individual
examiner generosity is highly correlated with examiner experience.

252

One may rightly question whether a 10 percent increase or decrease in the allowance rate is
feasible, but our data suggests that it is. We find a standard deviation of 15.8 percent among
examiner allowance rates and a standard deviation of 12.6 percent among art unit allowance
rates.
253
Compare specification 2 to specifications 4 and 5.
254
As with allowance rates, the variation in examiner experience is large with a standard
deviation of 823 applications. Accord Cockburn, et al., supra note _, at 39 (“We see that although
the average examiner in our sample has a lifetime experience of over 2,000 patents, a large
number are associated with over 4,000 patents, with a few outliers of over 7,000 patents.”).
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TABLE 19. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LIKELIHOOD PETITIONED PATENT
NEVER INSTITUTED – EXAMINER-RELATED VARIABLES
1

2

3

4

5

-0.050**
(0.020)

-0.045**
(0.020)

-0.048**
(0.020)

-0.049**
(0.020)

-0.045**
(0.020)

-0.010 (0.032)

-0.014 (0.032)

-0.011 (0.032)

-0.012 (0.032)

-0.014 (0.032)

Applicant, Prosecutor, and
Examiner Characteristics:
Small Entity

Individual Assignee
Large Firm Prosecutor
Solo Firm Prosecutor

0.063*** (0.019) 0.066*** (0.019) 0.064*** (0.019) 0.064*** (0.019) 0.066*** (0.019)
-0.025 (0.027)

No. of applications
examiner
Examiner’s overall
allowance rate
Art Unit allowance rate

-0.025 (0.027)

-0.024 (0.027)

-0.024 (0.027)

-0.025 (0.027)

-0.000032***
(0.000012)

-0.000018
(0.000013)

-0.000027**
(0.000012)

-0.000031**
(0.000012)

-0.193***
(0.074)

-0.203***
(0.075)
-0.227***
(0.086)

0.149 (0.094)

Allowance rate
differential (rel. to Art
Unit)

-0.034 (0.074)

Patent Characteristics:
Quarter First Institution
Decision

0.0080***
(0.0023)

0.0074***
(0.0022)

0.0075***
(0.0022)

0.0078***
(0.0023)

0.0073***
(0.0022)

Years earliest priority
to first petition

-0.0031
(0.0025)

-0.0022
(0.0025)

-0.0023
(0.0025)

-0.0029
(0.0025)

-0.0021
(0.0025)

Grant year

-0.0036
(0.0028)

-0.0010
(0.0026)

-0.0026
(0.0027)

-0.0032
(0.0027)

-0.0010
(0.0026)

-0.0061**
(0.0031)

-0.0062**
(0.0031)

-0.0063**
(0.0031)

-0.0062**
(0.0031)

-0.0062**
(0.0031)

High Tech

0.019 (0.020)

-0.008 (0.020)

0.007 (0.021)

0.003 (0.021)

-0.007 (0.020)

Pharma

0.059 (0.041)

0.113***
(0.041)

0.074* (0.042)

0.078** (0.041)

0.112***
(0.041)

Word Count / Claim

11e-6** (5e-6)

12e-6** (5e-6)

12e-6** (5e-6)

11e-6** (5e-6)

12e-6** (5e-6)

Num. of US Classes
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0.0013***
(0.0004)

0.0014***
(0.0004)

0.0013***
(0.0004)

0.0014***
(0.0004)

0.0014***
(0.0004)

-0.00015***
(0.00004)

-0.00016***
(0.00004)

-0.00015***
(0.00004)

-0.00015***
(0.00004)

-0.00015***
(0.00004)

0.0035 (0.0022)

0.0042*
(0.0022)

0.0036 (0.0022)

0.0040*
(0.0022)

0.0041*
(0.0022)

-0.0014
(0.0020)

-0.0011
(0.0020)

-0.0013
(0.0020)

-0.0013
(0.0020)

-0.0011
(0.0020)

-0.007 (0.019)

-0.007 (0.019)

-0.006 (0.019)

-0.009 (0.019)

-0.006 (0.019)

0.173** (0.073)

0.180***
(0.074)

0.172** (0.073)

0.176** (0.074)

0.179***
(0.074)

-0.073***
(0.021)

-0.079***
(0.021)

-0.076***
(0.021)

-0.077***
(0.021)

-0.079***
(0.021)

Log-likelihood

-1390

-1394

-1390

-1390

-1394

Observations

2527

2527

2527

2527

2527

Examination Intensity
Num. Reverse
Citations
Num. IDS Filed
Num. Foreign Family
Members
Post Grant Characteristics
Reassigned?
Individual Owned

PAE Owned

NOTE.—Population of 2532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the merits between 9/16/2012 and
1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus
“Instituted” compares the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once.
Marginal effects reported with discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors included in parenthesis.
* p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.

C. Determinants of Institution by Subset of the Population of Petitioned
Patents
Next, we present a series of regressions to examine the significance of
variables in the context of patents from particular industry and technology
groups. We do so for two reasons. First, different industries often have different
visions of the ideal patent system, and we believe that these differences are
justified in part due to well-documented industry and technology differences in
the efficacy of patents.255 Separating our analysis for patents related to particular
industries or technologies may reveal that these differences lead to variation
among proxies for patent quality. In addition to observing whether this leads to
changes in effect size and significance among variables included in the
regressions above, this also allows us to test whether other variables that failed
255

See supra note _.
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to show significance in the population-wide bivariate regressions presented
supra might nonetheless have significant effects in one or more subpopulations
of challenged patents.
The specifications shown below in Table 20 report regressions for six
different groups of patents: those prosecuted by large firms, those covering
medical technology, those covering pharmaceutical technology, those covering
software, and those owned by NPEs and PAEs.256 Overall, what we observe is
consistent with our findings above. Variables related to examiner grant rate,
number of technology classes, and number of reverse citations remain both
significant and similarly correlated in most subpopulations.
There are, however, a few noteworthy variations across these groups. First,
as shown below in Specifications 5 and 6, the sign of the coefficient for uniqueword-count-of-claim-1 is flipped for NPE- and PAE-owned patents (though
neither is significant), as is the sign of the overall-word-count-per-claim
coefficient for PAE patents. In short, while longer claims appear to be of higher
quality generally, the opposite may be true of patents owned by monetizing
entities. While this finding may have a number of explanations, it may suggest
at least in part a disproportionate preference among monetizers for patents that
are “skillfully drafted” in ways that increase word count while only superficially
narrowing claim scope.257
We also find that the negative relationship noted above between institution
and IPC counts is significant in these specifications only for software patents
and patents owned by NPEs. We further find that the sign of the coefficient
actually reverses in the cohort of patents prosecuted by large law firms. These
findings suggest to us that the significance of IPCs primarily reflects the
differing classification methodologies for software-related technologies
employed by the USPTO and WIPO.258
In addition, we find that contrary to our observations above, the number of
reverse citations added by the examiner to a challenged patent has a negative and
nearly significant (p = 0.112) correlation with institution in the subpopulation of
pharmaceutical patents. This finding may suggest that (consistent with
256

In Appendix Table A.1. we report these same specifications but for the probability the patents
in each group would be denied institution rather than never instituted.
257
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (explaining that the law should prevent broad
claims from issuing even if their breadth has been obscured by “[a] competent draftsman”); Mark
A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 905,
907 (noting that “experienced patent lawyers today . . . increasingly [draft patent claims to cover]
. . . the function of their [their client’s] program, not merely the particular way they achieved that
goal”); Josh Feng & Xavier Jaravel, Who Feeds the Trolls? Patent Trolls and the Patent
Examination Process, at *4 (Working Paper, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2838017 (“We find that patents purchased by NPEs are, on average, granted by
examiners who allow more incremental patents and patents with vaguer language.”).
258
See supra note _ and related text.
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conventional wisdom) more examiner citations can in fact indicate a more
thorough examination, but only in industries with relatively low patent density
and/or relatively clear claims.
We also find that several variables that failed to yield significant results in
the population of patents do have a significant correlation with institution among
one or more subpopulations. First, we find that the count of a challenged patent’s
U.S. parent applications is a significant predictor of institution for
pharmaceutical patents and NPE patents. Additionally (and quite interestingly),
we find that the relationship runs in the opposite direction for these groups. That
is, we find that pharmaceutical patents with more parent applications are less
likely to be instituted, while NPE-owned patents with more parents are more
likely to be instituted. The magnitude of the effect for pharmaceutical patents is
also particularly striking, with one additional parent application associated with
a nearly nine percent decrease in the chance of institution. On one hand, a large
number of parents may reflect applicants’ desire to perfect the claims covering
a valuable product, while on the other it may reflect an applicants’ struggle to
patent a marginal innovation in a crowded technological space. Potentially, our
results reflect that the former effect is more common in pharmaceutical patent
prosecution, while the latter is more common among patents that eventually
wind up in the hands of NPEs.259
We additionally find that the forward citation count for challenged patents,
while not significant among the population of patents, has a significant negative
relationship with institution for one subpopulation: patents owned by PAEs. On
one hand, as discussed above, citations by subsequent patents may reveal the
importance of the technology that a patent covers. On the other hand, Lerner has
shown a “publicity effect” which tends to increase citations to patents that have
previously been asserted,260 which may suggest that higher quality PAE-owned
patents are cited more often because they are litigated more often, rather than
more fundamental.

259

This hypothesis may also be supported by the fact we find a negative coefficient for patents
prosecuted by large law firms and a positive coefficient for software patents, though neither
effect is statistically significant.
260
Josh Lerner, Trolls on State Street?: The Litigation of Financial Patents, 1976-2005, at *1920 (Unpublished Manuscript, 2006), http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/Trolls.pdf.
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TABLE 20. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LIKELIHOOD
PETITIONED PATENT NEVER INSTITUTED
1 (Large)

2 (Medical)

3 (Pharma)

4 (Software)

5 (NPE)

6 (PAE)

-0.315**
(0.124)

-0.386**
(0.171)

-0.279
(0.253)

-0.349**
(0.178)

-0.466***
(0.124)

-0.433***
(0.136)

0.0100**
(0.0040)

0.0175**
(0.0069)

0.013 (0.011)

0.006 (0.005)

0.0009
(0.0034)

-0.004
(0.004)

0.014 (0.009)

0.020 (0.014)

0.017 (0.022)

-0.009
(0.011)

0.0021
(0.075)

0.0053
(0.085)

0.0094**
(0.0047)

0.0070**
(0.0034)

0.0050
(0.0039)

Applicant, Prosecutor
and Examiner
Characteristics:
Allowance rate
differential (rel. to
Art Unit)
Patent Characteristics:
Quarter First
Institution
Decision
Pendency (years)

Num. of IPC
Classes

-0.0036
(0.0037)

Num. of US
Classes

-0.021**
(0.010)

-0.025*
(0.015)

12e-6*
(6e-6)

24e-6**
(10e-6)

39e-6**
(15e-6)

2e-6
(19e-6)

16e-6**
(7e-6)

-33e-6
(21e-6)

0.0011
(0.0008)

0.0030**
(0.0012)

0.0055**
(0.0026)

0.0022**
(0.0010)

-0.0005
(0.0008)

-0.0008
(0.0008)

-0.00024***
(0.00006)

-0.00027
(0.00018)

-0.0010***
(0.0004)

-0.00021***
(0.00008)

-0.00011**
(0.00005)

-0.00005
(0.00006)

Num. Rev. Cites
Added by
Examiner

-0.0044**
(0.0022)

-0.0038
(0.0043)

0.026 (0.016)

0.0008
(0.0019)

-0.0006
(0.0018)

0.0014
(0.0019)

Num. IDS Filed

0.0049
(0.0039)

-0.0032
(0.0072)

-0.003
(0.012)

0.0060
(0.0053)

0.0002
(0.0038)

-0.0001
(0.0039)

0.013 (0.025)

0.003 (0.036)

0.014 (0.061)

0.019 (0.031)

0.016 (0.019)

-0.006
(0.022)

Word Count /
Claim
Unique Word
Count of Claim 1
Examination Intensity
Num. Reverse
Citations

Num. Final
Rejections

[Draft v. 2/7/2018]
Num. Parent
Applications

PTAB and Patent Quality

77

0.004 (0.008)

-0.012
(0.014)

0.089***
(0.029)

-0.0083
(0.0068)

-0.016***
(0.005)

-0.010
(0.006)

0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0004
(0.0005)

0.0010
(0.0012)

0.00003
(0.00029)

0.00020
(0.00014)

0.00031**
(0.00014)

Log-likelihood

-526

-225

-106

-281

-420

-289

Observations

874

373

181

504

829

621

Post Grant
Characteristics
Forward citations

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the merits between 9/16/2012 and
1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus
“Instituted” compares the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once.
Marginal effects reported with discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors included in
parenthesis. * p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.

VI. IMPLICATIONS
Finally, we make a few broad observations in light of the data reported
above. We then consider what patent reforms our observations suggest might
help improve patent quality, and conclude with a caution that our results should
be viewed with their limitations in mind.
A. Analysis
First and perhaps foremost, our findings suggest to us that patent quality is
heavily influenced by the people and entities who are directly involved in the
examination process. On the side of the applicant, we found a number of
significant negative relationships between institution and traits suggestive of a
lack of sophistication and resources (e.g,. small entity status, individual original
assignees, and selection of “solo” prosecution counsel), as well as a consistent,
positive relationship between institution and applicants’ willingness and ability
to pay for premium legal services (i.e., those provided by large law firms).
Also, with respect to the examiners assigned to challenged patents, we
consistently found a significant, negative relationship between institution and
both an examiner’s overall allowance rate and the length of an examiner’s tenure
with the USPTO. Interestingly, these correlations survive controls for other
examination-related variables including counts of rejections, IDSs, and reverse
citations, and thus suggest an effect that supersedes what is observable in
individual prosecution histories.
We additionally find evidence that patent breadth is important to patent
quality. Consistent with conventional wisdom, we find significant associations
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between institution and the number of U.S. technology classes assigned to a
patent, the length of a patent’s first claim, and the length of a patent’s
specification relative to its claim count.
Second, we find it noteworthy that many of the patent traits that we
examined had little or no correlation with institution. Despite their importance
in the existing literature, we found little evidence that forward citation counts
are a strong predictor of quality. In the multivariate analyses reported above, we
also found little evidence that the age of petitioned patents or the technology to
which they relate played a major role in IPR validity determinations. We
likewise found little evidence linking validity to the prosecution of related
applications in other countries. These latter three findings suggest that USPTO
examination (while no doubt far from perfect) has nonetheless been more
consistent than many believe over the last two decades, as well as more
consistent with the quality of examination conducted overseas by foreign patent
offices. Similarly, our findings suggest that the PTAB is not biased in favor of
or against any particular type of technology.
That said, our findings do suggest that APJs may not be entirely insulated
from outside influences. For example, our findings show that institution rates
have fallen over time even controlling for numerous other variables. This may
well be a reaction to the loud outcry from the patent bar about the high rates of
invalidity seen in the first several months of the PTAB’s existence, or instead a
practical workload-reducing response to PTAB’s unexpectedly high caseload.
We likewise see that patents owned by NPEs and PAEs are more likely to be
instituted even when we control for all the other significant patent traits, a fact
that plausibly reflects some degree of bias against the widely publicized
litigation tactics of so-called “patent trolls.”261
B. Recommendations
While we are reluctant to make strong causal claims based on our findings,
our observations do tend to suggest a few promising avenues for improving the
quality of patents issued by the USPTO. First, our findings are quite consistent
with existing research indicating that U.S. patent examiners have suboptimal
incentives to produce quality patents. Accordingly, our findings lend support to
ongoing efforts to modify U.S. patent examining procedures so that, for
example, senior examiners are given additional time to review the applications
they are assigned.262 In addition, our findings suggest that USPTO may wish to
261

Given that these potential influences may vary by judge, we recommend that future research
in this area investigate variations in institution rates across APJs.
262
See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Decreasing the Patent Office’s Incentives to
Grant Invalid Patents (Dec. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/es_
121317_decreasing_patent_office_incentives_grant_invalid_patents_pb.pdf.
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consider additional scrutiny of the prior art searches and office actions produced
by examiners with relatively high grant rates, as well as the training and
oversight afford to examiners in art units with relatively high grant rates.263
Second, our findings suggest that relatively broad applications tend to issue
as relatively low quality patents. Accordingly, our findings suggest that the
USPTO may wish to take steps to discourage, prevent, or provide additional
scrutiny to especially lengthy or broad applications. For example, the USPTO
could consider increasing existing “excess claim” and “size” fees,264 or
increasing the frequency with which examiners issue “restriction requirements”
to break up complex applications into a series of smaller ones. 265 The USPTO
may also wish to consider special examination procedures for applications that
span numerous technology classes, perhaps by assigning multiple examiners
with varied technical expertise to work as a team on such applications
Third, our findings suggest that relatively small applicants are
disproportionately likely to obtain low quality patents. While this effect may
have a number of explanations, its close relationship to the size of prosecution
counsel tends to suggest that our findings reflect at least to some extent applicant
sophistication and resources. Accordingly, our findings tend to support USPTO
efforts to educate applicants that are relatively small and relatively new,
including with respect to the importance of selecting competent counsel, the duty
to disclose prior art, careful claim drafting, and adequate technical disclosure in
the specification.
Last, but not least, we believe that our findings tend to suggest that inter
partes review is working as intended to eliminate low quality patents. Despite
years of criticism from many in the patent bench and bar, we find that the patents
flagged as problematic by the PTAB largely bear the traditional hallmarks of low
quality identified by conventional wisdom and prior academic research. At the
same time, we find little evidence of bias for or against particular industries or
types of patent owners (with the possible exception of PAEs). Accordingly, our
findings tend not to support ongoing efforts to radically re-structure or outright
eliminate inter partes review.
C. Limitations
An important caveat to the above recommendations, as well as to our
findings generally, is that our data is limited in a number of respects. For one, as
discussed in greater detail above, the population of patents subjected to inter
Accord Feng & Jaravel, supra note _, at *54 (estimating “that the share of NPE patents among
granted patents could be reduced by 20% by implementing a ‘second pair of eyes’ policy”).
264
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Fee Schedule, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#Patent Fees (last accessed Jan. 14, 2018).
265
See MPEP § 802-03.
263
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partes review is no doubt a highly selected sample of the total population of U.S.
patents. While we believe that our population of patents is less selected than
those used by many prior researchers, we nonetheless acknowledge that our
findings likely reflect some degree of selection bias. As a result, our findings
would likely change to at least some extent if a more diverse set of patents was
challenged in inter partes review, as well as if fewer petitions settled prior to the
issuance of an institution decision.266
In addition, inter partes review serves as a check on patent validity only
with respect to anticipation and obviousness in light of printed prior art. While
these are by far the most common bases on which U.S. patent applications have
been rejected and issued patents have been invalidated,267 our analysis excludes
other grounds of invalidity, including limits on patentable subject matter, the
substantial and specific utility requirements, enablement, written description,
indefiniteness, and best mode, as well as the various other ways in which a patent
may be invalidated under sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. Accordingly,
our study of patent quality is, by definition, a somewhat incomplete one. As a
result, our findings would likely change to at least some extent if it were possible
to challenge patents on additional grounds in inter partes review proceedings.
Finally, we acknowledge the existence of two additional limitations
inherent is using inter partes review institution decisions as a filter of patent
quality. First, institution decisions are to some extent preliminary in nature and
thus are prone to some degree of error. As discussed above, a non-trivial number
of final written decisions confirm the patentability of all instituted claims. While
we account for those decisions when they occurred, many inter partes reviews
settled after institution, but before a final written decision. In addition, though
the affirmance rate is high for PTAB decisions, a non-trivial number of decisions
are reversed on appeal. As a result, it is likely that a subsequent, more searching
analysis of challenged claims would in some instances lead to a conclusion
contrary to the one we used in this analysis. Second, while patent validity is
determined on a claim-by-claim basis, our analysis focuses on the attributes of
entire patents. Thus, as described in greater detail above, our analysis of
institution decisions is incomplete because it lumps together all once-instituted
(or always-instituted) patents despite the fact that many of these patents contain
claims that were never challenged in the first place, as well as claims that were
challenged but not instituted or not cancelled. In a future iteration of this project,
we hope to take a claim-level view of validity in order to overcome this
limitation.

266

However, insofar as patents selected for IPR are only those worth spending five- or six-figures
to challenge, policymakers may be less concerned about the multitude of lower value patents
missing from our study.
267
See Lu, supra note _.
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CONCLUSION
Despite these limitations, we believe that this project is the most
comprehensive look at patent quality undertaken to date. By taking advantage of
the recently popularity of inter partes review, we were able to assemble a set of
more than 2,500 U.S. patents that were the subject of at least one post-grant
decision with respect to the validity of their claims. In addition, by taking
advantage of the USPTO’s recent releases of bulk data to the public, we were
able to collect a large amount of data about each patent. Beyond information
available on the face of challenged patents, we were additionally able to identify
and assess each patent’s examiner and prosecution counsel, as well as
information about the various kinds of documents filed during each patent’s
prosecution.
Merging these two sets of data, we uncovered a number of patent attributes
with a strong, significant relationship to institution, including characteristics of
the people who prosecuted and examined challenged patents, characteristics of
the challenged patents themselves, and characteristics of the prosecution history
associated with each patent. Using the results of these bivariate comparisons,
we selected a subset of characteristics for further analysis in a series of
multivariate regressions.
Our multivariate analysis, in turn, revealed a number of especially
significant predictors of institution. Notably, our findings largely complement
earlier research on patent quality. Consistent with Frakes and Wasserman, we
find that more senior examiners (and those who aspire to promotion) may face
incentives that are detrimental to patent quality on the margin. Similarly,
consistent with Lei and Wright, we find a counterintuitive, negative relationship
between reverse citations and quality. At the same time, our findings reveal a
number of unexpected wrinkles that we believe warrant further research. We
find, for example, that software and business methods patents perform
surprisingly well in IPR. We also fail to find significance among several
variables that have been used as quality proxies in prior research, including
forward citation counts and concurrent examination by the EPO.
In addition to refining our ability to identify high and low quality patents,
our findings have importance for ongoing debates about how to improve ex ante
patent examination and how to measure the efficacy of inter partes review. While
it is impossible for us to conclude that any change in patent examination policy
or procedure would be cost justified,268 our results suggest several actions that
patent offices in the U.S. and abroad may wish to investigate to improve patent
quality, including additional oversight of examiners with high allowance rates
and greater scrutiny of especially complex applications. Further, our results
268

Meaning that the benefit to society from increases in patent quality would exceed the costs of
making the changes necessary to achieve those increases.
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suggest that to the extent that the PTAB is acting as a “patent death squad,” it is
a death squad targeting patents with indicia of relatively low quality, rather than
indicia of relatively high value. For example, medical and pharma patents, which
scholars tend to believe possess clearer boundaries and higher per-patent value,
have much lower institution rates than other patents, while NPE and PAE
patents, which are often most valued primarily for nuisance value assertion, are
more likely to be instituted.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A.1. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LIKELIHOOD PETITIONED PATENT DENIED INSTITUTED
1 (Large)

2 (Medical)

3 (Pharma)

4 (Software)

5 (NPE)

6 (PAE)

-0.299**
(0.128)

-0.335*
(0.175)

-0.210
(0.254)

-0.179
(0.197)

-0.225
(0.144)

-0.139
(0.177)

Pendency (years)

-0.0011
(0.0093)

0.013 (0.014)

-0.003
(0.023)

-0.020*
(0.012)

-0.0058
(0.086)

0.0050
(0.085)

Num. of IPC
Classes

-0.0025
(0.0038)

0.012**
(0.005)

0.0068*
(0.0039)

0.0051
(0.0039)

Applicant, Prosecutor
and Examiner
Characteristics:
Allowance rate
differential (rel. to
Art Unit)
Patent Characteristics:

Num. of US
Classes
Word Count /
Claim
Unique Word
Count of Claim 1

-0.018*
(0.010)

-0.020
(0.013)

5e-6
(7e-6)

21e-6**
(10e-6)

36e-6**
(17e-6)

-6e-6
(20e-6)

12e-6
(8e-6)

-32e-6**
(21e-6)

0.0016**
(0.0008)

0.0029**
(0.0012)

0.0044**
(0.0022)

0.0020*
(0.0011)

0.0008
(0.0009)

0.0010
(0.0010)
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Examination Intensity
Num. Reverse
Citations

-0.00008
(0.00006)

-0.00015
(0.00016)

-0.0007*
(0.0004)

-0.00009
(0.00008)

-0.00006
(0.00006)

0.00002
(0.00007)

-0.0054***
(0.0020)

-0.0049
(0.0045)

0.032**
(0.016)

-0.0010
(0.0020)

-0.0009
(0.0020)

-0.0020
(0.0022)

0.0038
(0.0042)

-0.0017
(0.0074)

-0.007
(0.011)

0.0028
(0.0056)

0.0032
(0.0035)

0.0027
(0.0037)

Num. Final
Rejections

0.042 (0.027)

0.009 (0.036)

0.065 (0.063)

0.049 (0.034)

0.028 (0.022)

-0.007
(0.026)

Num. Parent
Applications

-0.001
(0.008)

-0.008
(0.014)

0.076**
(0.029)

-0.014*
(0.007)

-0.016***
(0.006)

-0.015**
(0.007)

0.0001
(0.0003)

-0.0006
(0.0005)

0.0022
(0.0014)

-0.0003
(0.0003)

0.00015
(0.00017)

0.00023
(0.00018)

Log-likelihood

-571

-242

-113

-317

-504

-366

Observations

874

373

181

504

829

621

Num. Rev. Cites
Added by
Examiner
Num. IDS Filed

Post Grant
Characteristics
Forward citations

NOTE.—Population of 2,532 patents subject to an inter partes review institution decision on the merits between 9/16/2012 and
1/31/2017. Some patents were the subject of multiple merit institution decisions and accordingly, “Never Inst.” versus
“Instituted” compares the 671 petitioned patents never instituted on the merits to the 2055 patents instituted at least once.
Marginal effects reported with discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors included in parenthesis.
* p < .10; ** p < .05; and *** p < .01.

